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REGULATING PROXY PUTS: A
PROPOSAL TO NARROW THE PROPER
PURPOSE OF PROXY PUTS AFTER
SANDRIDGE
Mark H. Mixon, Jr.*
In Kallick v. SandRidge Energy, Inc., the Delaware Court of Chancery
broadly characterized proxy puts in general and adopted Unocal to review
the SandRidge board’s refusal to decide whether to approve a rival proxy
slate for purposes of neutralizing a proxy put in a bond indenture.
However, the court failed to answer whether a board has authority to adopt
a proxy put in the first place, and, if so, whether and under what
circumstances triggering a proxy put is proportionate to its purpose. This
Comment finds the court’s adoption of Unocal unsatisfying doctrinally, yet
recognizes that the result of subjecting proxy puts to a strict Blasius
compelling justification review would probably be similar to subjecting a
watermelon to Gallagher’s sledge: lenders and borrowers would be
removing pieces of proxy puts from their loan agreements for weeks.
Seeking a middle path, this Comment distinguishes Identity Risk as a
concern separate from Event Risk and proposes narrowing the proper
purpose of proxy puts to protecting against Identity Risk. There, Liquid
Audio emerges as a standard of review blending Blasius’s focus on the
stockholder franchise with Unocal’s functionality in an Identity Risk
framework that both legitimizes proxy puts and incentivizes contracting
parties to document the negotiation and adoption of wealth-maximizing
change of control provisions.
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INTRODUCTION
In Kallick v. SandRidge Energy, Inc.,1 the Delaware Court of
Chancery reviewed two primary issues: the legitimacy of proxy puts
purporting to protect creditors’ interests; and the appropriate standard of
review for analyzing board actions that interfere with the stockholder
franchise.2 A form of change of control covenant often included in bond
indentures and credit agreements, proxy puts implicate the omnipresent
specter of board entrenchment addressed in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co.3 due to their defensive, anti-takeover effects.4 However,
proxy puts arguably also implicate the “compelling justification” standard
articulated in Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.5 “because the effect of
the [p]roxy [p]ut is to place a toll on the voting decision of the
electorate[.]”6 As demonstrated by SandRidge’s debt agreements, proxy
puts are triggered by a successful proxy challenge that replaces a majority
of a board of directors within a specified period of time and provide

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

68 A.3d 242 (Del. Ch. 2013).
Id.
493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 259.
564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988).
SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 258.
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creditors with the right to put the company’s debt back to the company at a
specified price.
The core of then-Chancellor Strine’s analysis in SandRidge considers
whether the SandRidge board of directors reasonably exercised its
discretion in failing to approve a change of control for purposes of a proxy
put under the Unocal standard of review—although the court, citing the
combined Unocal-Blasius standard created by the Delaware Supreme Court
in MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., left open the possibility of a
higher standard.7 The court also drew on Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries8
to focus its good faith analysis under Unocal on whether the board’s failure
to approve the change of control was for a proper purpose.9 Finding that
the board’s fiduciary duty to represent in good faith the best interests of its
stockholders was consistent with its contractual duty of good faith and fair
dealing owed to its creditors, the court held that “a board may only fail to
approve a dissident slate if the board determines that passing control . . .
would constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty, in particular, because the
proposed slate poses a danger that the company would not honor its legal
duty to repay its creditors.”10 Because the SandRidge board could not
demonstrate a proper purpose for failing to approve the change of control,
the court concluded the board “likely acted with an absence of good faith
and reasonableness inconsistent with their fiduciary duties.”11
However, despite deciding SandRidge on narrow grounds, the court
left questions unanswered and created ambiguity by broadly characterizing
a prior case and the proxy puts at issue. Limited facts necessarily restricted
the court to a narrow holding and prevented it from conducting a broad
analysis that would be useful to companies and creditors attempting to
contract in the shadow of shareholder-creditor agency costs. In addition,
despite that proxy puts are thought of as “event risk covenants,” intuition
suggests that they have nothing to do with events and everything to do with
the identity of a rival slate; although not heretofore so defined, proxy puts
are more accurately considered “identity risk covenants.” Accordingly, this
Comment attempts to narrow the court’s broad characterizations to address
7. 813 A.2d 1118, 1132 (Del. 2003) (approving a unified Unocal-Blasius standard of
review for defensive actions touching on issues of control, but maintaining that:
When the primary purpose of a board of directors’ defensive measure is to interfere with or
impede the effective exercise of the shareholder franchise in a contested election for
directors, the board must first demonstrate a compelling justification for such action as a
condition precedent to any judicial consideration of reasonableness and proportiona[lity].
(emphasis original)).
8. 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).
9. SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 259.
10. Id. at 260 (citation omitted).
11. Id. at 261.
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two unanswered questions, resolve ambiguity, and provide clarity to
contracting parties in the future.
The court in SandRidge failed to address adequately two questions
related to the validity of proxy puts. First, does a board of directors even
have the requisite authority to bind the corporation to a change of control
covenant designed to prevent stockholders from electing a new board of
directors?12 Second, under what circumstances and to what degree is a
board of directors permitted to trade stockholders’ right to elect the board
of directors in favor of other interests? The answer to the first question
may be simple: Section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law
grants the board broad authority to manage the business and affairs of the
corporation,13 and Section 122(13) grants every corporation the power to
make contracts.14
But Delaware has long recognized that “[t]he
shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the
legitimacy of directorial power rests.”15 Without the benefit of the court’s
analysis, it is unclear whether a board has authority to contract away the
source of its legitimate power to enter into such a contract.
The court in SandRidge characterized summarily the proxy puts at
issue as lacking the “sole or primary purpose” of impeding a stockholder
election,16 and stated that, “[b]y definition, a contract that imposes a penalty
on . . . stockholders seeking to elect a new board[] has clear defensive
value.”17 These broad characterizations enabled the court to avoid
analyzing whether the board had the requisite power to adopt the proxy
puts; instead, the “clear defensive value” of the proxy puts merited only
heightened reasonableness review under Unocal.18
However, this
12. This question is the first of two tests of corporate action proposed by Adolf A.
Berle, Corporate Powers As Powers In Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931) (“[I]n
every case, corporate action must be twice tested: first, by the technical rules having to do
with the existence and proper exercise of the power; second, by equitable rules somewhat
analogous to those which apply in favor of a cestui que trust to the trustee’s exercise of wide
powers granted to him in the instrument making him a fiduciary”). Delaware subscribes to
Berle’s twice-tested approach. See, e.g., Carsanaro v. Bloodhound Techs., Inc., 65 A.3d
618, 641 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“Corporate acts are ‘twice-tested,’ once for statutory compliance
and again in equity.”).
13. 8 Del. C. § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed
by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”).
14. 8 Del. C. § 122(13) (“Every corporation created under this chapter shall have
power to . . . make contracts . . . .”).
15. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988). See also
MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003) (finding that the board of
directors could not expand the size of its membership to prevent shareholders from electing
successor directors).
16. SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 258.
17. Id. at 259.
18. Id. at 259.
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Comment recognizes that the result of subjecting proxy puts to a strict
Blasius compelling-justification review would probably be similar to
subjecting a watermelon to Gallagher’s sledge: lenders and borrowers
would find themselves removing pieces of proxy puts from their loan
agreements for weeks.19 But characterizing proxy puts broadly so they fit
into a preferred standard of review is less helpful than developing a more
nuanced understanding of their purpose, operation, and trade-offs to
facilitate a more informed analysis of which standard of review ought to
apply. This Comment attempts the latter with an eye toward developing a
balanced outcome consistent with Delaware doctrine.
In reaching its conclusion in SandRidge, the court also broadly
characterized a key precedent case, San Antonio Fire & Police Pension
Fund v. Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,20 in the following ways. First, the
court stated, “Amylin focused on the nature of the Proxy Put as a provision
giving the creditors protection against a new board that would threaten their
legitimate interests in getting paid.”21 Also, “[Amylin] recognized that the
board should take into account the interests of its creditors in deciding
whether to approve the slate.”22 In addition, “as Vice Chancellor Lamb
also noted, . . . it follows that a board may only fail to approve a dissident
slate if the board determines that passing control to the slate would
constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty, in particular, because the
proposed slate poses a danger that the company would not honor its legal
duty to repay its creditors.”23 The court further characterized Amylin,
summarizing, “[i]n other words, unless the incumbent board . . . made a
specific determination that the rival candidates proposed a program that
would have demonstrably material adverse effects for the corporation’s
ability to meet its legal obligations to its creditors, the incumbent board
should approve the rival slate . . . .”24 As will be discussed in greater detail
19. Cf. Stephen Byeff, The Spirit Of Blasius: SandRidge As An Antidote To The Poison
Put, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 412 (2015) (arguing SandRidge should have applied Blasius
to avoid creating doctrinal confusion and diminishing the primacy of the shareholder
franchise); Marcus Kai Hintze, “If You Poison Us Do We Not Die?”—A Critical Analysis
of the Legality of Poison Puts in the Wake of San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v.
Amylin, Inc., 2010 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 767, 793 (2010) (proposing “a rule that any time a board
of directors enters into an agreement with a proxy put, it must show that it did so with a
compelling justification”).
20. 983 A.2d 304 (Del. Ch. 2009).
21. SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 260.
22. Id. at 260, fn 95. The court goes on, reading the statement “as qualifying the
[Amylin] court’s later statement, in a footnote, that ‘the directors are under absolutely no
obligation to consider the interests of the noteholders’ in deciding whether to approve the
new slate.” Id. (citing Amylin, 983 A.2d at 316 n.37).
23. SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 260 (second emphasis added).
24. Id. at 246. The court goes on, concluding, “absent any determination by the
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below, in none of these instances was the court in Amylin focused on
creditors’ legitimate interests in getting paid or on threats to the company’s
ability to repay its creditors.
These broad characterizations of Amylin raise the second question left
unanswered in SandRidge: assuming Delaware law permits a board to
bargain away some of the stockholders’ fundamental right to elect directors
in favor of creditors’ interests in getting paid, under what circumstances
and to what degree would such a trade-off be reasonable or proportionate?
In other words, if proxy puts represent a legitimate trade-off between
creditors’ interests in getting paid and stockholders’ right to elect a new
board, how much of the shareholder franchise may the board trade away,
and under what circumstances? By its nature, this bargain benefits both
creditors and boards at the expense of “the ideological underpinning upon
which the legitimacy of directorial power exists.”25 Although the Unocal
standard of review that the court adopted in SandRidge would have enabled
it to conduct such a proportionality analysis, the limited facts of the case
narrowed the basis for its conclusion to Unocal’s good faith prong. And
even though Unocal provides a functional standard of review for proxy
puts, it still does not answer whether a board has the authority to adopt
proxy puts without some showing that a compelling justification supports
their facially disenfranchising effects.
Therefore, this Comment considers both the circumstances under
which boards may validly adopt and exercise proxy puts and the
proportionality of proxy puts to their purpose using Liquid Audio’s unified
Unocal-Blasius standard of review. Throughout, this Comment is mindful
of Professor Edward Rock’s suggestion that “Delaware should worry [that
investors believe it favors equity over debt], if inadequate creditor
protection raises a firm’s cost of capital and thereby affects the desirability
of Delaware law.”26 In Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality,
Rock surveys evidence suggesting that the classic shareholder-manager
agency cost problem no longer remains significant.27 For discussion
purposes, this Comment presupposes the accuracy of Rock’s suggestion
that shareholder-manager agency costs have been regulated effectively and

incumbents that the rival slate has suspect integrity or specific plans that would endanger the
corporation’s ability to repay its creditors, there is no harm threatened to the creditors by the
election of the slate.” Id.
25. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659.
26. Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L.
REV. 1907, 1986 (2013).
27. See Rock, supra note 26, at 1926 (noting that incentive compensation, board
reforms, and changes in concentration of shareholdings are among the reasons why the
shareholder-manager agency cost problem is no longer significant).
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considers how Delaware courts can adapt existing corporate law doctrines
to regulate shareholder-creditor agency costs by focusing narrowly on the
proxy puts at issue in SandRidge.
To consider the questions left unanswered in SandRidge, this
Comment proceeds as follows. Part II reviews the two cases interpreting
proxy puts that predate SandRidge. Part III details the facts, analysis, and
conclusions of SandRidge itself with the goal of confining the case as
narrowly as possible. Part IV considers briefly the impact of a recent
decision on the court’s analysis in SandRidge. Part V examines the nature
of proxy puts more closely and proposes to narrow the court’s broad
characterization of the device’s purpose. Part VI proposes a framework of
review for proxy puts with the goals of addressing the questions left
unanswered in SandRidge and enabling Delaware to better regulate
shareholder-creditor agency costs in the future. Part VII concludes.
I.

PRECEDENT CASES ADDRESSING PROXY PUTS

The Delaware Court of Chancery decided two cases concerning proxy
puts prior to SandRidge. In Hills Stores Co. v. Bozic,28 the court reviewed
change of control covenants, which the Hills board had added to managers’
employment agreements during a takeover battle, under the good faith
prong of Unocal.29 In San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin
Pharmaceuticals,30 the court interpreted a bond indenture to determine
whether the Amylin board had the contractual power and right to approve a
change of control and neutralize proxy puts.31 Importantly, although both
cases discussed a board’s duty to consider in good faith the best interests of
their company and its stockholders under Unocal, neither proceeded to
analyze the reasonableness or proportionality of the board’s action under
Unocal’s second prong. As such, both Hills and Amylin are narrow
decisions.
A.

Hills Stores Co. v. Bozic

The dispute in Hills concerned the Hills board’s decision to trigger
change of control provisions embedded in certain senior executives’
severance agreements.32 One year after Hills had emerged from bankruptcy
in 1993, Dickstein Partners, a 12% shareholder, initiated a consent
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

769 A.2d 88 (Del. Ch. 2000).
Id. at 106–07.
983 A.2d 304 (Del. Ch. 2009).
Id. at 313.
Hills, 769 A.2d 88, 89 (Del. Ch. 2000).

ARTICLE 7 (MIXON).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1320

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

9/29/15 2:22 PM

[Vol. 17:4

solicitation to replace four Hills directors and to cause Hills to conduct a
share buyback using leveraged financing.33 With the advice of outside
counsel, the board opposed the buyback, believing “it was unwise to take
on such substantial debt so soon after emerging from bankruptcy and that it
was preferable to stick with management’s existing game plan.”34 The
company, among other things, entered into new employment agreements
with top executives “to allow them to focus on doing their jobs without
distraction by Dickstein’s overtures.”35 The agreements included change of
control covenants entitling the executives to severance equaling three times
their annual salary (including bonuses and tax gross-ups) in the event of a
change of control not approved by a majority of continuing directors.36
After Dickstein and others filed class and derivative actions challenging the
employment agreements, the parties reached a settlement agreement in
which, among other things, the parties agreed to waive permanently any
claims arising out of the agreements.37
But in 1995, Dickstein again became hostile, proposing to take over
Hills by merger or proxy contest and promising to refinance Hills’ existing
debt, purchase Hills, and auction Hills to the highest third-party buyer.38 At
a meeting of the Hills board, the outside directors decided to reject the
Dickstein proposal as inadequate for several reasons: “the company’s
current strategy was sound,” “it was a bad time to sell a low-end retailing
company,” “the Dickstein leverage strategy was of the kind that had caused
other retailers to descend into bankruptcy,” and “Dickstein had not secured
firm financing for its Proposal.”39 In addition, management expressed its
view that “it would prefer not to work at Hills under Dickstein’s plan,
because that plan would leave the company in a highly leveraged
condition.”40 The board sought reelection against Dickstein’s proposed

33. Id. at 91.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 92. The agreement defined an Approved Change of Control as follows:
The term “Approved Change of Control” shall mean a Change of Control that has occurred
with the prior approval of a majority of the Continuing Directors and the term “Continuing
Director” shall mean any member of the Board of Directors of the Company who is not an
Acquiring Person or a nominee or representative of an Acquiring Person or of any affiliate
or associate of an Acquiring Person and any successor to a Continuing Director who was
recommended for election or elected to succeed a Continuing Director by a majority of the
Continuing Directors then on the Board of Directors of the Company.
Id.
37. Id. at 93.
38. Id. at 94–95.
39. Id. at 97.
40. Id. at 96.

ARTICLE 6 (MIXON).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

REGULATING PROXY PUTS

9/29/15 2:22 PM

1321

slate and did not erect any additional defensive measures.41
Considering whether to approve the Dickstein change of control for
purposes of the severance agreements, the board focused on its contractual
duties to the covered executives and recognized Hills faced “exactly the
circumstances that had been anticipated going to contract[.]”42 The board
believed it owed a contractual duty to trigger the severance unless they
“believed in good faith that the Change in Control was not harmful to the
company.”43 Because the board continued to believe, as they had upon
entering into the severance agreements, that “the Dickstein Change in
Control would be seriously adverse to the interests of the company and its
stockholders[,]” the board voted to trigger the severance package.44 Later,
after receiving complete and adequate disclosure, the shareholders elected
Dickstein’s slate by a large margin, thus triggering, among other things,45
the severance packages under the employment agreements.46
After taking control of Hills, Dickstein caused the company to sue the
former board for breaching its duty of loyalty by failing to approve the
change of control for purposes of the severance agreements.47 For our
purposes, the critical question facing the court was under which standard
should the change of control covenants be reviewed.48 “Because of the
defensive origins and purpose of the employment agreements, [the court
applied] the Unocal standard of review[.]”49 However, the court found that
the previous settlement agreement, to which both Dickstein and Hills were
parties, prevented the plaintiffs from challenging the board’s initial
decision to enter into the severance agreements in the first place, thus
conceding “that those Agreements were entered into for a proper purpose
and that Hills received adequate consideration[.]”50
This factor affected which standard of review the court chose to adopt
and how that standard of review applied. First, the court refused to apply
the Blasius “compelling justification” standard of review because the
plaintiffs were “estopped from arguing . . . that the Employment
Agreements were entered into for the ‘primary purpose of thwarting the

41. Id. at 97.
42. Id. at 101 (citation omitted).
43. Id. at 101.
44. Id.
45. The successful proxy contest triggered several change of control provisions. In
particular, “Hills’s primary creditor, Chemical Bank, exercised its default rights, forcing
Dickstein to refinance the company’s debt.” Id. at 101.
46. Id. at 101.
47. Id. at 90.
48. Id. at 103.
49. Id. at 90 (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)).
50. Id. at 102.
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exercise of a stockholder vote.’”51 The plaintiffs attempted to argue that
the agreements had “the incidental effect of coercing or placing an undue
toll on the free exercise of the shareholder vote[,]” but the court rejected
this argument by recasting it as implicating Unocal’s proportionality prong
instead.52 Nevertheless, upon considering the coercion issue, the court
again insisted that the plaintiffs were “estopped from making the argument
that the Severance is so large as to constitute a coercive influence on a Hills
stockholder vote.”53
Second, after the court concluded that Unocal was the appropriate
standard of review, the court reiterated the significance of the plaintiffs’
previous waiver of the right to challenge the board’s adoption of the
employment agreements. Under Unocal’s two-pronged inquiry,54 the board
must first demonstrate that, “after a reasonable investigation, it determined
in good faith that the corporation faced a threat warranting a defensive
response” before demonstrating “the proportionality of its defensive
measures to the threats it identified.”55 However, because the plaintiffs
were estopped from challenging the validity of the agreements and that the
agreements were disproportionate, “the first prong is of preeminent
importance.”56 In other words, for the plaintiffs to prevail on their breach
of loyalty claim, they would have to prove to the court that the board had
failed to make “a good faith and informed judgment that the Dickstein
Change in Control was a threat to Hills and its stockholders.”57 This the
plaintiffs could not do.
The court concluded that the board’s informed, good faith belief that
the change of control posed a threat of harm to the company and its
stockholders, as well as its belief that it should live up to its contractual
commitment, was reasonable under the circumstances.58 In sum, the
board’s decision to trigger the severance packages was not a breach of its
fiduciary duty of loyalty because the plaintiff failed to produce evidence
challenging the board’s decision under the first prong of Unocal and was
estopped from raising any challenges as to proportionality under Unocal’s
second prong. Instead, the court concluded that the board’s decision “to
take a consistent approach to the issue of whether to approve the Dickstein
51. Id. at 103 (citing Blasius, 564 A.2d at 660).
52. Id. at 103.
53. Id. at 104.
54. As the Hills case was decided in 2000, the Delaware Supreme Court had not yet
combined the Unocal and Blasius standards of review in its Liquid Audio decision, which
was decided in 2007.
55. Hills, 769 A.2d at 107 (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955–57).
56. Id. at 107.
57. Id. at 108.
58. Id. at 109.
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Change in Control was a reasonable response in the circumstances
presented.”59 In so concluding, the court endorsed the board’s outside
counsel’s advice that because the board believed in good faith that the
Dickstein Change of Control was not in the best interests of Hills and its
stockholders upon entering into the employment agreements, the board’s
subsequent decision to trigger the severance package was justified in light
of its continued belief that the Dickstein Change of Control was still, and
for the same reasons, not in the best interests of Hills and its stockholders.60
It is important to recognize the narrow basis on which the court
decided the Hills case. First, because of a prior settlement, the court
estopped the plaintiffs from challenging any aspect of the board’s initial
decision to enter into the employment agreements containing change of
control provisions. In the court’s words, “[I] will . . . only allow them to
challenge whether the [board] made appropriate decisions in 1995
regarding whether to oppose the Dickstein Change in Control and to trigger
the Covered Executives Right to Severance.”61 Thus, Hills focuses
narrowly on the board’s decision to trigger the change of control
provisions. Second, the plaintiffs also were estopped from challenging the
proportionality of the board’s decision to trigger the change of control
provisions under Unocal’s second prong. Therefore, the court’s holding in
Hills that the board’s decision to trigger the change of control provisions
was reasonable in the circumstances stands only on the court’s narrow
analysis of the board’s good faith and informed judgment that the change
of control was a threat to the company and its stockholders under Unocal’s
first prong.
B.

San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.

In 2009, the court further analyzed a board’s contractual power and
right to approve a change of control in Amylin. The narrow question at
issue in Amylin was “whether a commonplace provision found in a trust
indenture governing publicly traded notes prevents the issuer’s board of
directors from ‘approving’ as ‘continuing directors’ persons nominated by
stockholders in opposition to the slate nominated by the incumbent
directors.”62 Finding that such a narrow interpretation would cause change
of control covenants to “operate as improper entrenchment devices that
59. Id. at 108.
60. Id. at 100.
61. Id. at 103.
62. San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharms., 983 A.2d 304 (Del.
Ch. 2009).
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coerce stockholders into voting only for persons approved by the
incumbent board[,]” the court held that the directors had the contractual
power under the indentures to “approve” any nominee and still seek
reelection.63
However, the court never directly answered whether the Amylin board
had properly exercised that right consistent with its implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing. The court said “the measure of whether the approval
was in good faith was whether the board believed that the dissident slate
posed a danger to the interests of the corporation and its stockholders.”64
But the court found that the record as to the board’s deliberations regarding
whether the dissident slate posed a threat was undeveloped65 and held that
the contractual right to approve issue was unripe.66
Although the Amylin case began as a stockholder class action against
the company and its individual directors, it is a contract case, not a
fiduciary duty case; the court’s primary holding arose from the company’s
cross-claim against the trustee of its bond indentures. In March 2009,
plaintiff pension fund San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund filed a class
action complaint alleging various breaches of fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty against Amylin and its individual directors.67 In April, plaintiff
added to the complaint Bank of America, N.A. (“BANA”)—the
Administrative Agent for Amylin’s senior secured credit agreement dated
December 21, 2007 (“Credit Agreement”)68—and The Bank of New York
Mellon Trust Company, N.A.—the “Trustee” under the trust indenture
dated June 8, 2007 (the “Indenture”) for Amylin’s 3.00% convertible senior
notes due 2014 (the “2007 Notes”)69—as necessary defendants, seeking
declaratory judgments as to the company’s contractual rights with both.70
Shortly thereafter, the individual directors and Amylin answered the
plaintiff’s complaint and included a cross-claim against the Trustee.71
Before trial, the plaintiff entered into a partial settlement with

63. Id. at 307.
64. Id. at 316 (citing Hills, at 108–09).
65. Id. at 317. To the extent it was, the court observed that the decision to approve
may not have been the good faith exercise of the board’s considered business judgment. Id.
66. Id. at 318. The court qualified its decision to treat the issue as unripe by pointing
out that no result of the current election could trigger the covenants at issue and that the
parties were free to replead a case after the election when the facts of the record would be
more developed. Id. at 317.
67. Id. at 311.
68. Id. at 307.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 311.
71. Id.
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Amylin.72 In addition, Amylin and BANA reached a consent and waiver
agreement before trial that mooted the related claims against BANA.73
Finally, the stockholders planning proxy contests reduced the number of
insurgents they had nominated such that the change of control provisions
under the Indenture could no longer be immediately triggered.74 “Thus, the
central issue in [Amylin] is whether or not the Amylin board has both the
power and the right under the Indenture to approve the stockholder
nominees.”75
The Indenture operated by declaring an event of default to have
occurred upon a “Fundamental Change,” which was defined to have
occurred if, among other things, “at any time the Continuing Directors do
not constitute a majority of the Company’s Board of Directors . . . .”76 The
agreement further defined “Continuing Directors” to be:
(i) individuals who on the Issue Date constituted the Board of
Directors and (ii) any new directors whose election to the Board
of Directors or whose nomination for election by the stockholders
of the Company was approved by at least a majority of the
directors then still in office (or a duly constituted committee
thereof) either who were directors on the Issue Date or whose
election or nomination for election was previously so approved.77
By contrast, the Change of Control covenant in the Credit Agreement
defines Continuing Directors directly within its terms and uses a narrower
definition. Under the Credit Agreement, a Change of Control occurs if,
among other things:
An event or series of events by which . . . (b) during any period
of 24 consecutive months, a majority of the members of the
board of directors or other equivalent governing body of the
Company cease to be composed of individuals
(i) who were members of that board or equivalent governing
body on the first day of such period,
(ii) whose election or nomination to that board or equivalent
governing body was approved by individuals referred to in clause
(i) above constituting at the time of such election or nomination
at least a majority of that board or equivalent governing body, or

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id. at 312.
Id. at 313.
Id.
Id. at 308.
Id.
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(iii) whose election or nomination to that board or other
equivalent governing body was approved by individuals referred
to in clauses (i) and (ii) above constituting at the time of such
election or nomination at least a majority of that board or
equivalent governing body (excluding, in the case of both clause
(ii) and (iii), any individual whose initial nomination for, or
assumption of office as, a member of that board or equivalent
governing body occurs as a result of an actual or threatened
solicitation of proxies or consents for the election or removal of
one or more directors by any person or group other than a
solicitation for the election of one or more directors by or on
behalf of the board of directors).78
Compared to the language in the bond indenture, the emphasized language
in the credit agreement precludes stockholders from replacing directors
pursuant to an actual or threatened proxy fight or consent solicitation. In
other words, the provision precludes the stockholders from contesting the
incumbency of the board without risking a default.
The court interpreted the Continuing Director provision in the bond
indenture as giving the board the power to “approve” a rival slate for
purposes of neutralizing the proxy put and still nominate its own candidates
to contest the rivals.79 But it also contrasted this outcome to its
interpretation of the Credit Agreement, which, by comparison, it suggested
“would prohibit any change in the majority of the board as a result of any
number of contested elections, for the entire life of the notes.”80
Continuing, the court warned that “such an eviscerating effect on the
stockholder franchise would raise grave concerns[,]” that the court would
expect to see evidence that the board received “extraordinarily valuable
economic benefits for the corporation that would not otherwise be available
to it[,] and that “the court would have to closely consider the degree to
which such a provision might be unenforceable as against public policy.”81
Similar to the court’s decision in Hills, it is important to recognize
what the court did and did not do in Amylin. First, the central issue in
Amylin is one of pure contract interpretation, namely, whether the board
has the power and right under the Indenture to approve the stockholder
nominees. Second, after finding the board’s contractual right under the
Indenture to approve stockholder nominees was limited only by its implied

78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 309 (emphasis added).
Id. at 314.
Id. at 315.
Id.

ARTICLE 6 (MIXON).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

REGULATING PROXY PUTS

9/29/15 2:22 PM

1327

duty of good faith and fair dealing arising from the Indenture,82 the court
concluded that the record as to whether the board had exercised its
discretion was incomplete and thus held the issue to be unripe.83 Therefore,
the court in Amylin held only that the board had the power under the
Indenture to approve the stockholder nominees and still run its own slate
against them. Accordingly, the court’s discussion of the board’s right
under the Indenture to approve the stockholder nominees was dicta.
Nevertheless, given the court’s later reliance on Amylin in SandRidge,
a closer look at the Amylin court’s interpretation of Hills is useful. In
keeping with its contractual interpretation inquiry, the Amylin court found
that the Hills court, “in considering whether the board was justified [under
its contractual duties] in not approving the change in control, recognized
that the measure of whether the approval was in good faith was whether the
board believed that the dissident slate posed a danger to the interests of the
corporation and its stockholders.”84 The court stated its rule, relying on
Hills, to be that “the board may approve the stockholder nominees if the
board determines in good faith that the election of one or more of the
dissident nominees would not be materially adverse to the interests of the
corporation or its stockholders.”85
Hanging a footnote on this rule, the court qualified it, saying:
In other words, [the board may approve the stockholder nominees
if the board determines in good faith that] passing control would
not constitute a breach of the directors’ duty of loyalty to the
corporation and its stockholders. It is important to recognize here
that the directors are under absolutely no obligation to consider
the interests of the noteholders in making this determination.86
Maintaining the context of the court’s contractual interpretation inquiry, the
second half of this footnote must be read directionally. Independent of any
consideration of the interests of its creditors, a board’s fiduciary duties
require it to determine in good faith whether passing control to stockholder
nominees would be materially adverse to the interests of the corporation or
its stockholders, or in other words, whether passing control would
constitute a breach of its duty of loyalty to the corporation and its
stockholders. After making such a determination in the negative, a board
may approve stockholder nominees without breaching its implied
contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing.87 Importantly, this
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 316 (bracketed language added).
Id. at 316.
Id. at 316 n.37 (bracketed language added).
Id. at 316.
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bifurcated approach comports with the Hills case, where the board made a
determination, independent of any consideration of the interests of its
contractual counterparties, that the change of control was a harmful threat
to Hills and its stockholders.88
The court found the application of its rule to be problematic—and for
good reason. First, the court acknowledged that Amylin had presented “no
evidence regarding the board’s deliberation with respect to the decision to
approve the stockholder-nominated slate[,]”89 and that “circumstances at
least raise a question whether the board’s decision to approve was made in
a good faith exercise of its considered business judgment[.]”90 For that
reason, the court held that the contractual right to approve issue was unripe.
Second, although unacknowledged, the court failed to recognize in its
contractual duty of good faith analysis that it also had no evidence
regarding the board’s deliberation with respect to the decision to enter into
the change of control provisions in the first place. In fact, the question was
not even at issue beyond a duty of care claim that the court quickly
resolved at the end of the opinion.91
But Amylin’s statement of its rule is partially inconsistent with Hills
and in need of clarification. As discussed above, the board in Hills would
have breached its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing by approving
the Dickstein Change of Control because its good faith, informed judgment
that the change of control would be harmful to the company and its
stockholders that motivated the board’s adoption of the employment
agreements containing the change of control provisions had persisted until
they reached an identical judgment and decided to trigger the provisions.
In other words, because the circumstances that motivated the board’s
adoption of the agreement were part of the contract’s consideration, the fact
that those exact circumstances persisted framed the board’s later decision
to grant the bargained-for consideration as required by its contractual duty
of good faith. The board in Amylin made no such determination.
The rule in Amylin is thus clarified as follows: A board has the
contractual right under a proxy put to approve a rival slate if (1) the board
determines on an informed, good faith basis that passing control to the rival
slate would not be a breach of its duty of loyalty, and (2) approving the
rival slate is not a breach of the board’s implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing under the proxy put. In Amylin, the court held that the facts

88. Hills, 769 A.2d at 108–09. See also Hills, 769 A.2d at 100 (“[Hills’s counsel Allen
Finkelson] advised the board that the obligation of the directors was to determine whether a
Dickstein-led change in control of Hills was in the best interests of Hills stockholders.”).
89. Amylin, 983 A.2d at 316.
90. Id. at 317.
91. Id. at 318.
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necessary to deciding the first part of the rule were unripe and did not
conduct an analysis under the second part. Also, the rule is consistent with
the outcome of Hills; because the court held that the Hills board determined
in good faith that passing control to Dickstein would be a breach of its duty
of loyalty, the board had properly determined that it had no contractual
right to approve the change of control under the proxy put.
Nevertheless, neither the court’s analysis nor its rule provides
meaningful insight into whether the board properly discharged its fiduciary
duties. In other words, Amylin’s rule is properly limited to the narrow
context of determining whether a board satisfied its contractual duty of
good faith and fair dealing—especially considering the court’s holding that
the issue was unripe. This narrow interpretation is framed by the reality
that the analysis in question arose from Amylin’s cross-claim against the
Trustee of the Indenture.
II.

KALLICK V. SANDRIDGE ENERGY, INC.

The case of SandRidge involved a board of directors that refused to
neutralize a proxy put by approving a rival proxy slate on the grounds that
the rival slate was less qualified.92 Plaintiff-stockholder Gerald Kallick
filed a complaint against SandRidge and its individual directors in the
Delaware Court of Chancery and moved for declaratory and injunctive
relief, seeking
(i) to enjoin the defendants from soliciting any consent
revocations; (ii) to have any consent revocations obtained to date
declared invalid; and (iii) to enjoin the defendants from taking
any steps to hinder TPG’s consent solicitation until they have
complied with their fiduciary duties and have approved the TPG
slate, or have explained in full why they will not approve it.93
The court applied Delaware’s three-pronged standard for a preliminary
injunction to grant Kallick more narrowly tailored injunctive relief than he
had sought and no mandatory or declaratory relief.94 But the court did not
analyze each prong individually; instead, the court “discuss[ed] the facts in
the record and the applicable law, and explain[ed] why the defendants are
likely violating their fiduciary duty of loyalty to SandRidge and its
92. Kallick v. SandRidge Energy, Inc., 68 A.3d 242, 245 (Del. Ch. 2013).
93. SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 252.
94. Id. at 253. The court stated the standard as follows: “To prevail on a motion for
preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits
of his claims; (2) he will suffer imminent, irreparable harm if an injunction is not granted;
and (3) the balance of equities weighs in favor of issuing the injunction.” Id. (citing
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hldgs., Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986)).
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stockholders.”95 As to the defendants’ justifications for failing to decide
whether to approve the rival proxy slate, the court made “findings of fact as
to them consistent with the appropriate procedural standard, which requires
[the court] to determine, from the record before [the court], what would
likely be the state of reality found to exist after trial.”96
This Part will analyze and attempt to narrow SandRidge by tracking
the structure used by the court therein. Part A sets out the background to
the dispute, as well as the court’s findings of fact regarding the defendants’
proffered justifications for their challenged actions. Part B reviews the
court’s decision to adopt a Unocal standard of review. Part C analyzes the
court’s holding that the board’s actions were likely a violation of its
fiduciary duties. Part D notes the court’s efforts to distinguish the Hills
case.
A.

Background to the Dispute and Findings of Fact

SandRidge Energy was an oil and natural gas exploration and
production company97 that went public in 2007.98 In November 2012, after
six years of “abysmal” performance and “lavish[ing] compensation” on its
CEO, the SandRidge board became the target of a consent solicitation
seeking to amend the bylaws to destagger the board, remove all directors,
and install an entirely new slate.99 TPG-Axon (“TPG”), the hedge fund
seeking the consent solicitation, also sought to include stockholder
representatives, replace the CEO, and investigate strategic alternatives to
maximize the value of SandRidge’s assets, including an asset sale.100 TPG
filed its preliminary consent solicitation statement on December 26,
2012.101
In response to TPG, the incumbent board adopted a poison pill,
restricted stockholders’ ability to act by written consent, and required an
affirmative vote of more than 50% of all stockholders to amend bylaws
relating to director elections.102 In addition, on December 27, 2012, the
incumbent board filed a preliminary consent revocation statement warning
stockholders that replacing the board without its approval would trigger
95. Id. at 253.
96. Id. at 253 (citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Bayer CropScience L.P., 958
A.2d 245, 251–52 (Del. Ch. 2008).
97. Id. at 244.
98. Id. at 248–49.
99. Id. at 244.
100. Id. at 249. Another major stockholder echoed TPG-Axon’s concerns with
SandRidge a few days later. Id.
101. Id. at 250.
102. Id. at 249.
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change of control covenants in the company’s bond indentures and require
SandRidge to offer to repurchase $4.3 billion of debt from its lenders at
101% of par.103
Throughout its opinion, the court refers to the change of control
covenant at issue as a “Proxy Put,” explaining that “the term is
appropriate[] because the Proxy Put gives the noteholders the right to put
back their debt after a vote that seats a new board that has not been
approved by the ousted incumbents.”104 Comparing the term “Proxy Put”
to “poison pill,” the court emphasized that it implied “no judgment about
the device’s utility” and only meant to “use language that tracks the
device’s operation.”105 Under the indentures at issue in SandRidge, a
Change of Control occurs if,
during any period of two consecutive years, individuals who at
the beginning of such period constituted the Board of Directors
of the Company or any Successor Parent (together with any new
directors whose election to such board or whose nomination for
election by the stockholders of the Company or any Successor
Parent, as the case may be, was approved by a vote of 66 2/3% of
the directors then still in office who were either directors at the
beginning of such period or whose election or nomination for
election was previously so approved), cease for any reason to
constitute a majority of such Board of Directors then in office.106
SandRidge had entered into multiple note agreements, all identical in
relevant part, beginning in 2008, but the record surrounding whether the
lender or SandRidge had sought to include the Proxy Puts was
nonexistent.107 From the outset, the court noted that, consistent with Moran
v. Household International, Inc.,108 a plaintiff could challenge both a
board’s decision to agree to a change of control covenant and whether the
board properly used its discretion under the covenant to approve a change
103. Id. at 250.
104. Id. at 244, n. 8.
105. Id. Despite the court’s comparison of the terms, proxy puts and poison pills differ
in one doctrinally significant respect: the supreme court validated poison pills in part upon
the recognition that they do not materially interfere with the stockholder franchise. See Air
Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 96 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“Notably, the pill in
Moran was considered reasonable in part because the Court found that there were many
methods by which potential acquirors could get around the pill. One way around the pill
was the ‘proxy out’—bidders could solicit consents to remove the board and redeem the
rights.”) (citing Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1985). In other
words, proxy puts are not like poison pills because unapproved proxy fights do not trigger
poison pills.
106. Id. at 250 (emphasis added by court).
107. Id. at 247–48.
108. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
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of control.109 Here, however, because no record of negotiations existed,
both the plaintiff and the court were limited to attacking and analyzing the
board’s exercise of discretion required by the Proxy Put. Accordingly, the
court assumed the “provisions were accepted by management without
resistance and without any input from the board.”110
On January 15, 2013, TPG filed its definitive consent solicitation
statement with the SEC.111 The board then filed its definitive consent
revocation statement on January 18, reiterating the potential harm to
stockholders if the Proxy Puts were triggered, but also admitting that “if the
Board takes actions to approve the TPG-Axon Group Nominees that are
permitted by the Indentures, such refinancing would not be required.”112
However, the board stated that it had not yet decided whether it would
approve TPG’s slate.113
A month later, the board stated in an 8-K that because the debt at issue
was trading above 101% of par, the bondholders were “unlikely” to redeem
them, but that the company could obtain any financing necessary if notes
were redeemed.114 Accordingly, the board changed its position on the
threat posed by an unapproved slate, suggesting that the election of an
unapproved slate might have no impact on the company.115 Nevertheless,
the board continued to refuse to decide whether to approve TPG’s proposed
slate for purposes of the Proxy Put.116
In support of their refusal to approve TPG’s slate for purposes of the
Proxy Put, the defendants proffered the following justifications: (1) “that
the TPG slate does not consist of directors with sufficient energy
experience[,]”117 and (2) granting approval “would compromise the
company’s ability to obtain financing because . . . such lenders would
charge a higher price for credit, perceiving SandRidge as a company that
‘circumvents’ change of control provisions.”118 As to the defendants’ first
argument, the court found that “[n]othing in this record indicates that any
incumbent board member or incumbent board advisor has any reasonable
basis to dispute the basic qualifications of the TPG slate.”119 As to the

109. SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 247.
110. Id. at 248.
111. Id. at 251.
112. Id. (citing Pl.’s Ex. P (SandRidge Energy, Inc., Definitive Consent Revocation
Statement (Jan. 18, 2013) at 8 [hereinafter Definitive Consent Revocation Statement]).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 251–52.
115. Id. at 252.
116. Id. at 257.
117. Id. at 253.
118. Id. at 255.
119. Id.

ARTICLE 6 (MIXON).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

REGULATING PROXY PUTS

9/29/15 2:22 PM

1333

defendants’ second argument, the court found that “[t]he incumbent board
has identified no specific threat that the TPG slate’s plans have on the
ability of SandRidge to repay its creditors.”120
To support this conclusion, the court noted that
the incumbent board and its financial advisors have failed to
provide any reliable market evidence that lenders place a tangible
value on a Proxy Put trigger—not a change in a board
composition accompanying a merger or acquisition or another
type of event having consequences for the company’s capital
structure, but a mere change in the board majority.121
In addition, in his deposition, one of SandRidge’s independent directors
admitted that the company derives no benefit from the Proxy Puts.122
According to the court, “[t]his testimony implies that the board gave little
or no consideration to the adoption of the Proxy Put.”123
B.

The Standard of Review

The defendants argued that the correct standard of review should be
Delaware’s business judgment rule, under which the court would defer to
the incumbent board’s decision not to approve TPG’s slate if it was
supported by a rational business purpose.124 The plaintiff, on the other
hand, argued that the court should apply the “compelling justification”
standard “because the effect of the Proxy Put is to place a toll on the voting
decision of the electorate [and] the primary purpose of such a provision is
disenfranchising within the meaning of the Blasius standard.”125 To trigger
Blasius, “the challenged action had to be ‘taken for the sole or primary
purpose of thwarting a shareholder vote.’”126
The court rejected a stand-alone Blasius standard because it “does
little to address situations like this, where a contractual provision cannot be
said to have the ‘sole or primary purpose’ of impeding the stockholders’
vote[.]”127 Instead, the court chose to focus its Unocal analysis using
“Schnell’s generalized insistence that any director action be in fact taken
for a proper purpose.”128 In adopting a Unocal standard of review, the

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 257.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 257.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 258.
Id. at 258 (citing Blasius, 564 A.2d at 662).
Id. at 258.
Id. at 259 (citing Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del.
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court reasoned that “Unocal is the proper standard of review to examine a
board’s decision to agree to a contract with [change of control provisions]
and to review a board’s exercise of discretion as to the change of control
provisions under such a contract.”129 To support its decision, the court
broadly characterized Proxy Puts as “a contract that imposes a penalty on
the corporation [and stockholders seeking to elect a new board]” that has
“clear defensive value.”130
Although a reliable shoehorn to invoking a preferred standard of
review, this broad characterization of proxy puts is neither precise nor
desirable. By characterizing proxy puts as contracts with clear defensive
value, the court sidestepped silently the question of whether the SandRidge
board had the authority to adopt the proxy puts in the first place. The court
was able to do so in part because the plaintiff’s claim focused narrowly on
whether the board exercised its contractual discretion under the proxy puts
consistent with its fiduciary duties and not whether the board’s decision to
adopt the Proxy Puts was valid, and also in part because the record
surrounding the board’s negotiation of the Proxy Puts was nonexistent.131
Without a record as to the purpose or intended design and effect of the
Proxy Puts, the court exercised its discretion to broadly characterize the
device as a contract with clear defensive value that “cannot be said to have
the ‘sole or primary purpose’ of impeding the stockholders’ vote[,]”132
instead assuming that they “might have a legitimate purpose of protecting
creditors who in fact insisted on its inclusion for their own good-faith
reasons[.]”133 This Comment considers a more precise characterization of
proxy puts in Part V.
Meanwhile, it is interesting to note that the court partially supported
its decision to apply the Unocal standard of review by citing to the
Delaware Supreme Court case MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio,
Inc.,134 which the court characterized as “provid[ing] a responsible form of
review that smokes out self-interest and pretext[] by requiring boards that
face the omnipresent specter of Unocal to justify their actions as reasonable
in relationship to a threat faced by the corporation.”135 However, in Liquid
Audio, the supreme court held that
[t]o invoke the Blasius compelling justification standard of

1971)).
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 259 (citing Moran v. Household Int’l., Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
Id. at 259.
Id. at 247–48.
Id. at 258.
Id.
Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d at 1129.
SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 259.
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review within an application of the Unocal standard of review,
the defensive actions of the board only need to be taken for the
primary purpose of interfering with or impeding the effectiveness
of the stockholder vote in a contested election for directors.136
Thus, despite the court’s clear statement in SandRidge that it was applying
Unocal, one could argue that it was applying Liquid Audio’s unified
standard of review. Given the narrow basis for the court’s decision in
SandRidge, this Comment considers the application of the Liquid Audio
standard to proxy puts in Part VI.
Finally, the court framed its Unocal analysis as whether “the directors
[complied] with their Unocal duties by identifying a circumstantially
proper and non-pretextual basis for their actions[.]”137 According to the
court, “[b]y smoking out the directors’ reasons, Unocal surfaces the issues
at stake, including the possibility of bad faith.”138 In a footnote, the court
reiterated the standard, stating, “the first prong of the Unocal test is
‘designed to ensure that a defensive measure to thwart or impede a
takeover is indeed motivated by a good faith concern for the welfare of the
corporation and its stockholders[;]’”139 and “a board that takes defensive
measures in response to a hostile offer must show, under the first prong of
the Unocal test, that ‘it determined in good faith [] that the [offer]
presented a threat . . . that warranted a defensive response[.]’”140
Importantly, the court made clear that its holding was based only on its
analysis under Unocal’s first prong.
C.

The Court’s Analysis and Conclusion

Based on the facts and the court’s view of the record, the court
concluded, “the directors have failed to demonstrate a reasonable
justification for their refusal to consider whether to approve the TPG slate
for purposes of the good faith standard in Unocal.”141 In other words, the
court held that the board’s decision to simply remain silent as to whether it
approved of the rival slate for purposes of the Proxy Put was in bad faith.
Accordingly, the court enjoined the board from soliciting consent
revocations, voting any proxies it had received, and otherwise impeding
TPG’s consent solicitation in any way until the board approved the TPG

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Liquid Audio, 813 A.2d at 1132 (emphasis original).
SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 259.
Id. at 259.
Id. at 259 n.90 (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955).
Id. at 259 n.90 (citing Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1375).
Id. at 259–60.
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slate.142
To reach its conclusion, the court relied heavily on its previous
decision in Amylin.143 As detailed above, the court in Amylin interpreted
similar change of control provisions and made clear that a board’s “only
duty to the creditors [under the contracts] was to honor the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”144 The court in SandRidge read
Amylin as holding that “the board could approve the new slate if ‘passing
control would not constitute a breach of the directors’ duty of loyalty to the
corporation and its stockholders.’”145 In other words, “the duty of loyalty
requires the incumbent board to exercise their contractual discretion with
the best interests of SandRidge and its stockholders firmly in mind, to the
extent that it can do so without breaching the very limited obligations it
owes to its noteholders.”146
This analysis is sufficient to reaching the court’s conclusion in
SandRidge: the board had made no determination that the rival slate posed
a threat to the company, much less a good faith determination, and Amylin
made it clear that the board had the contractual right to approve the rival
slate. Therefore, the board’s refusal to approve the rival slate was likely
not motivated by a good faith concern for the welfare of the corporation
and its stockholders and was thereby in breach of its duty under Unocal’s
first prong. Yet the court continued its analysis and began to recharacterize
Amylin as having been concerned with creditors’ legitimate interests in
getting paid:
Because, as Vice Chancellor Lamb also noted [in Amylin], the
failure to approve a new slate might “impinge on the free
exercise of the stockholder franchise,” and because a board that
acts in good faith must seek to protect the stockholders’ ability to
make an uncoerced choice of directors, it follows that a board
may only fail to approve a dissident slate if the board determines
that passing control to the slate would constitute a breach of the
duty of loyalty, in particular, because the proposed slate poses a
danger that the company would not honor its legal duty to repay
its creditors.147
This aspect of the court’s opinion in SandRidge broadens the court’s
prior opinion in Amylin without justification. And broadly characterizing
Amylin has the effect of broadening the basis for the court’s holding in

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 247.
Amylin, 983 A.2d at 304.
SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 260 (citing Amylin, 983 A.2d at 314–16).
Id. at 260 (citing Amylin, 983 A.2d at 316 n. 37).
Id. at 261.
Id. at 260 (citing Amylin, 983 A.2d at 319) (second emphasis added).
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SandRidge. To narrow SandRidge, this Comment attempts to scale back
the court’s characterizations of Amylin therein.
The court in Amylin did not discuss a company’s legal duty to repay
its creditors.
Nevertheless, the court in SandRidge continued to
recharacterize Amylin as such, stating, “this court in Amylin focused on the
nature of the Proxy Put as a provision giving the creditors protection
against a new board that would threaten their legitimate interests in getting
paid.”148 Amylin did no such thing. To the contrary, the Amylin court
stated clearly in a footnote its view that “directors are under absolutely no
obligation to consider the interests of the noteholders in making this
determination.”149 Then, the court in SandRidge listed three situations that
would threaten creditors’ legitimate interests in getting paid: (1) “the
proposed new board consists of ‘known looters[,]’” (2) “persons of suspect
integrity[,]” or (3) “the insurgent slate could have plans for the company
posing a genuine and specific threat to the corporation and its ability to
honor its obligations to its creditors that prevent the incumbent board from
approving them in good conscience for purposes of the Proxy Put.”150
Regarding this third situation, the court recharacterized explicitly the
Amylin court’s determination that “the directors are under absolutely no
obligation to consider the interests of the noteholders” as having meant
instead that “the directors are under no obligation to place any greater
emphasis on the interests of the noteholders in making their decision as to
the Proxy Put than as to any other decision that implicates the noteholders’
contractual rights.”151 To the contrary, Amylin made clear that a board’s
good faith, informed judgment as to whether a change of control was not in
the best interests of the company or its stockholders is independent from
any subsequent determination of whether to approve the change of control
for purposes of discharging its contractual duties—and even then the
court’s analysis focused on the board’s power and rights under the contract
and not the interests of its counterparty.152 At minimum, this portion of
SandRidge characterizes Amylin as placing a greater emphasis on creditors’
interests, when in fact Amylin insisted that a board had no such duty.
Between Amylin’s bifurcated approach and SandRidge’s
148. Id. at 260 (citing Amylin, 983 A.2d at 307 (“[C]onstrued in accordance with
generally applied standards, the provision is properly understood to permit the incumbent
directors to approve as a continuing director any person, whether nominated by the board or
a stockholder, as long as the directors take such action in conformity with the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and in accordance with their normal fiduciary
duties.”)).
149. Amylin, 983 A.2d at 316 n.37 (emphasis original).
150. SandRidge, 68 A.2d at 260.
151. Id. at 260 n.95 (citing Amylin, 983 A.2d at 316 n.37).
152. Amylin, 983 A.2d at 316 n.37.
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recharacterization of Amylin as a unified approach, the bifurcated approach
is the better of the two. The board’s initial determination is binary—either
the board believes in good faith that the change of control is a threat to the
company and its stockholders or it does not—and has nothing to do with
the counterparty’s interests under the contract. If the board determines in
good faith that the change of control is not a threat to the company and its
stockholders, then the company has no duty to trigger a remedy under the
contract. The court stated as much in SandRidge.153 Alternatively, if the
board determines in good faith that the change of control is a threat to the
company and its stockholders, it is an exercise of bad faith to approve the
change of control simply to avoid payment under the contract.154 The court
reached this conclusion in Hills, not Amylin, and did so on a different
record and under different circumstances.155
As discussed previously, a critical distinction between Hills and
Amylin is the record of the circumstances under which the respective
companies agreed to the contracts containing the change of control
provisions. In Hills, the record demonstrated that the Hills board agreed to
the severance packages precisely because it believed in good faith that the
Dickstein Change of Control posed a threat of harm to Hills and its
stockholders.156 Thus, its decision to trigger the promised remedy was
reinforced by its belief that it had a contractual duty to trigger the
bargained-for remedy under the exact circumstances contemplated by the
contract.157 To the contrary, in Amylin there was no such record. First, the

153. See SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 260 (“[W]here an incumbent board cannot identify that
there is a specific and substantial risk to the corporation or its creditors posed by the rival
slate, and approval of that slate would therefore not be a breach of the contractual duty of
good faith owed to noteholders with the rights to the Proxy Put, the incumbent board must
approve the new directors as a matter of its obligations to the company and its
stockholders[] . . . .”).
154. Hills Stores Co. v. Bozic, 769 A.2d 88, 109 (Del. Ch. 2000).
155. The court also reached this conclusion in SandRidge, but expressly included
consideration of creditors’ rights in doing so:
[W]here an incumbent board cannot identify that there is a specific and
substantial risk to the corporation or its creditors posed by the rival slate, and
approval of that slate would therefore not be a breach of the contractual duty of
good faith owed to noteholders with the rights to the Proxy Put, the incumbent
board must approve the new directors as a matter of its obligations to the
company and its stockholders, even if it believes itself to be better qualified and
have better plans for the corporation that the rival slate.
SandRidge, 68 A.2d at 260–61.
156. Hills, 769 A.2d at 101.
157. Id. at 100–01. “The outside directors felt that the company had a contractual
obligation to the Covered Executives to trigger their right to Severance, unless the board
believed in good faith that the Change in Control was not harmful to the company.” Id.
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stockholder-plaintiff’s duty of care claim was based on the fact that the
board failed to learn of the change of control provisions before agreeing to
the Indenture.158 Second, the court held that whether the board had made
an informed, good faith determination that the rival slate posed a threat to
the company and its stockholders was unripe given the underdeveloped
state of the record.159 A final distinction between Hills and Amylin is that,
unlike in Hills (or even SandRidge), the central dispute in Amylin
concerned the contractual rights and duties between the company and a
creditor.160 Critically, the court in Amylin failed to emphasize or even
recognize a contractual duty owed by the board to consider its creditors’
legitimate interests in getting paid pursuant to a change of control
provision. Thus, the court in SandRidge purports to find in Hills and
Amylin an emphasis on creditors’ legitimate interests in getting paid that
simply are not there.
As demonstrated, this broad characterization of proxy puts as giving
creditors “protection against a new board that would threaten their
legitimate interests in getting paid” appears throughout the court’s analysis
in SandRidge.161 The effect is to imply a broad validation of proxy puts as
an ordinary contractual device properly adopted both to protect a
company’s creditors’ legitimate interests in getting paid and to enable the
company to defend against threats posing a danger to the company’s ability
to honor its legal duty to repay its creditors. Framed as such, the
SandRidge court’s broad characterization of proxy puts appears reasonable.
However, the court inadequately considers the cost of broadly validating a
device that only accomplishes its intended purposes by either deterring
stockholders from replacing an incumbent board or triggering enormous
penalties against the company and its stockholders upon their electing to do
so.
Accordingly, this Part has attempted to narrow the SandRidge court’s
broad characterizations of the Amylin case and suggest that the court’s
broad characterizations of proxy puts enabled it to avoid reviewing both the
proper purpose of the device and a board’s statutory authority to adopt the
device. However, the court’s attempt in SandRidge to narrow its own
analysis by distinguishing its prior decision in the Hills case assists the
furtherance of this Comment’s purpose.

158.
159.
160.
161.

Amylin, 983 A.2d at 318.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 313.
SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 260.
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Distinguishing the Hills Case

Notwithstanding the court’s previous analysis as discussed at length
above, SandRidge includes an informative discussion drawing sharp
distinctions between this case and the Hills case.162 In particular, the court
focused on (1) the nature of the contracts at issue in Hills compared to
those at issue in SandRidge,163 and (2) the nature of the threats identified by
the board in Hills compared to those (not) identified by the board in
SandRidge.164
The court points out that the severance agreements at issue in Hills
“involve considerations that are distinct from credit agreements.”165
Although both lenders and employees want to get paid, an employee’s
“concerns about the identity of her boss [] are far more extensive, and
legitimately so.”166 Elaborating, the court explains,
A lender, such as the noteholders in this case, can protect itself
by financial covenants, such as coverage and leverage ratios.
The reality is that the debt, in this context, issued by the company
is impersonal . . . . An employee cannot protect herself against a
fundamental shift in managerial approach, and has an obvious
interest in knowing who her boss is.167
The court objects to lumping different contracts including change of
control provisions together, emphasizing that “the contractual obligation
that the corporation owes to its contractual partner in exercising discretion
to approve a change in control is [] influenced by the contractual
expectations of that partner.”168 The court then distinguishes between
changes of control under credit agreements: “Critical for lenders are
changes in control that directly affect capital structures in a way that could
impair the lenders’ ability to get repaid, such as mergers or leveraged
equity acquisitions.”169 Second, the court distinguishes the Hills case on
the basis of the Hills board’s determination that the Dickstein Change of
Control threatened the company’s fundamental ability to honor its legal
obligations.170
Nevertheless, the court fails to distinguish expressly the circumstances

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 261.
Id. at 262.
Id. at 263.
Id. at 262.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 263.
Id.
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of the Hills case from its invocation in SandRidge of the legitimacy of a
board’s determination that a rival slate’s plans pose a threat to the
company’s ability to honor its obligations to its creditors.171 Even though
the court uses qualifying phrases like “demonstrably material adverse
effects”172 and “specific and substantial risk”173 throughout its opinion, it
fails to characterize accurately the proper threat in SandRidge as
bankruptcy.
Unlike SandRidge, Hills had recently emerged from
bankruptcy and was already in financial distress; thus, the board
determined that Dickstein’s proposal to take on enormous leverage
threatened the ability of the company to continue as a going concern.174
Although far narrower than the court’s characterization in SandRidge, the
facts of Hills suggest proxy puts might be construed as narrowly as
protecting creditors from a rival slate threatening to put the company in
bankruptcy.
III. UPDATE: THE HEALTHWAYS CASE
Recently, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued a transcript ruling
concerning a proxy put in Pontiac General Employees Retirement System v.
John Ballantine, et al. and Healthways, Inc.175 The relevant facts of
Healthways arose in May 2012 when Healthways stockholders voted by an
overwhelming margin to approve a precatory proposal to declassify the
board over the board’s objections.176 Nearly eighteen months later, the
board amended its articles of incorporation to phase out its classified
structure. Yet, immediately after the May 2012 proposal and long before
its adoption in October 2013, the board entered into a fifth amended and
restated revolving credit and term loan agreement.177
Unlike its
predecessor, this agreement contained what the plaintiffs characterized as a
“dead hand proxy put.”178 In 2013, Healthways issued additional debt
without the “dead hand proxy put” provisions; but the new debt included
cross-default provisions triggering default if the company defaulted on at

171. See id., at 246, 260.
172. Id. at 246.
173. Id. at 260.
174. Id. at 263.
175. C.A. No. 9789-VCL, transcript (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2014) [hereinafter Healthways
Transcript] (on file with author).
176. Healthways Transcript, at 69.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 70. See also Pontiac General Employees Retirement System v. John W.
Ballantine, et al. and Healthways, Inc., C.A. No. 9789-VCL, redacted compl. (Del. Ch. June
24, 2014), at 18 [hereinafter, Healthways Complaint](claiming the “dead hand proxy put”
would cause enormous economic harm to the plaintiffs).
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least $10 million of its other debt.179
Stockholder pressure on the Healthways board continued. The board
rejected an 11% stockholder’s public demand to remove the CEO, but
eventually resolved to grant the stockholder representation on the board in
January 2014 after the stockholder threatened to wage a proxy fight.180 The
“dead hand proxy put” provision at issue in Healthways operates
identically to the one in the credit agreement appearing in Amylin.181 Thus,
because the new directors assumed office as a result of a threatened proxy
fight, they were not considered continuing directors for purposes of the
“dead hand proxy put.”182 Before filing its complaint in Healthways, the
plaintiff served the company with a books and records request under
Section 220 “seeking documents and records relating to the dead hand
proxy put.”183 However, according to the plaintiff, “the company failed to
produce documents showing that there was substantive negotiation about
the proxy put and no documents that suggested, to use the language of
Amylin, that the company received ‘extraordinarily valuable economic
benefits’ that might justify the proxy put.”184
In Healthways, the plaintiff brought breach of fiduciary duty claims
against the individual directors; a claim for aiding and abetting against
SunTrust, the administrative agent for the bank group that extended the
credit agreement to Healthways; and a declaratory judgment that the dead
hand proxy put is unenforceable.185 The court denied a motion to dismiss
by the individual directors and the company on ripeness grounds and a
motion to dismiss for failure to state an aiding and abetting claim by
SunTrust. The court determined that the plaintiff’s claim was ripe due to
two present injuries: the deterrent effect of the proxy put and an ongoing
Section 141(d) violation.186 In addition, the court determined that the
plaintiff pled facts supporting the knowing participation requirement for
aiding and abetting liability by demonstrating that SunTrust became “a
party to an agreement containing an entrenching provision that creates a
conflict of interest on the part of the fiduciaries on the other side of the
negotiation” long after Amylin and SandRidge put parties on notice that the
179. Healthways Transcript, at 70. The cross-default provisions were included on
issuances totaling $145 million in debt that would go into default if the company defaulted
on any other loans in excess of $10 million. Id.
180. Id.
181. Compare Healthways Complaint, at 15, with Amylin, 983 A.2d at 309. See also
text accompanying note 78 (citing the credit agreement).
182. Healthways Transcript, at 70–71.
183. Id. at 71.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 72–74, 75.
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proxy puts were questionable.187
Healthways contributes two new bases for narrowing the court’s prior
decisions in the previous three cases: statutory claims under Section 141
and an aiding and abetting claim. The § 141(d) claim in Healthways takes
its support from two cases considering poison pills. In Carmody v. Toll
Brothers, Inc., the Delaware Court of Chancery ruled on a motion to
dismiss that the “complaint states legally sufficient claims that the ‘dead
hand’ provision of the Toll Brothers Rights Plan violates 8 Del. C. §§
141(a) and (d).”188 Because the statute requires restrictions on a board’s
authority to manage the business and affairs of a corporation to be in the
statute itself or the corporation’s certificate of incorporation and requires
the creation of different classes of directors with unequal voting powers to
be stated in the certificate of incorporation, the plain language of the “dead
hand” provisions that restricts Continuing Directors’ authority to manage
the company’s business and affairs and denies non-Continuing Directors
equal voting power gives rise to cognizable statutory invalidity claims.189
In addition, in Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro, the
Delaware Supreme Court held invalid a “slow hand” poison pill because it
“impermissibly circumscribes the board’s statutory power under Section
141(a) and the directors’ ability to fulfill their concomitant fiduciary
duties.”190 Importantly, the supreme court in Quickturn emphasized that
“to the extent that a contract, or a provision thereof, purports to require a
board to act or not act in such a fashion as to limit the exercise of fiduciary
duties, it is invalid and unenforceable.”191
As to the aiding and abetting claim in Healthways, the court did not
provide a detailed analysis, but noted merely that the court’s previous
decisions in Amylin and SandRidge put the parties on notice that proxy puts
were of questionable validity and recognized the conflict of interest
187. Id. at 80–81.
188. 723 A.2d 1180, 1190 (Del. Ch. 1998). In relevant part, Section 141(d) states:
The certificate of incorporation may confer upon holders of any class or series of stock the
right to elect 1 or more directors who shall serve for such term, and have such voting powers
as shall be stated in the certificate of incorporation. The terms of office and voting powers
of the directors elected in the manner so provided in the certificate of incorporation may be
greater than or less than those of any other director or class of directors.
8 Del C. § 141(d). In addition, Section 141(a) states, in relevant part:
The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed
by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this
chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.
8 Del. C. § 141(a).
189. Id. at 1190–91.
190. 721 A.2d 1281, 1293 (Del. 1998).
191. Id. at 1292 (citing Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637
A.2d 34, 51 (Del. 1994)).
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between the company’s board and its stockholders created by the proxy
put.192 Nevertheless, and even though Healthways is only a transcript
ruling decided at the pleading stage, as of March 1, 2015, the firm
representing the plaintiff who filed the complaint had successfully targeted
and caused numerous other companies to remove “dead hand proxy puts”
in their debt agreements.193
The Healthways case narrows the court’s previous decisions in the
following ways.
First, the Continuing Director provisions in the
Employment Agreement at issue in Hills194 and the Credit Agreement
appearing (though not directly at issue) in Amylin195 are subject to direct
attack and review under the supreme court’s binding precedent in
Quickturn and the chancery court’s persuasive precedent in Carmody.
Given the similarity with which the Continuing Director provisions operate
in the proxy put and poison put cases, it is difficult to imagine the court
reaching a different conclusion in future proxy put cases. Second, although
the Indenture in Amylin196 and the Indenture in SandRidge197 do not operate
by defining Continuing Directors directly, the provisions nevertheless
operate by creating two classes of directors with unequal voting rights
indirectly. As before, it is difficult to imagine the court determining that
these provisions are not invalid solely because they do not define
Continuing Directors expressly.
Third, given the court’s nowdemonstrated willingness to recognize aiding and abetting claims against
third-parties entering into agreements with these provisions, the proxy puts
at issue in Hills, Amylin, SandRidge, and Healthways will probably be
192. See Healthways Transcript at 79–80 (“There was ample precedent from this Court
putting lenders on notice that these provisions were highly suspect and could potentially
lead to a breach of duty on the part of the fiduciaries who were the counter-parties to a
negotiation over the credit agreement.”).
193. See, e.g., San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Stanzione, et al. and Arris
Group Inc., C.A. No. 10078-VCG, proposed order & notice (Dec. 5, 2014) (“In this case,
defendant Arris Group, Inc. . . . removed from a bank loan agreement the ‘continuing
director’ provision which plaintiff alleged was invalid and a product of fiduciary duty
breaches by the Company’s board of directors.”); Ironworkers Local No. 25 Pension Fund
v. Donehy and Joy Global Inc., C.A. No. 10341-VCP, letter (Jan. 28, 2015) (“[N]ominal
defendant Joy Global Inc. and defendant Bank of America, N.A. have eliminated the “Dead
Hand Proxy Put” in the debt agreement that gave rise to this action.”); Ironworkers Local
No. 25 Pension Fund v. Khoury, et al. and B/E Aerospace, Inc., C.A. No. 10342-VCN, letter
(Dec. 24, 2014) (“[D]efendant B/E Aerospace, Inc. and defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A. have terminated the Dead Hand Proxy Put and refinanced the debt under the debt
agreement that is the subject of this action.”).
194. See supra note 36 (citing the text of the Continuing Director provision).
195. See supra text accompanying note 78 (citing the text of the Continuing Director
provision).
196. See supra text accompanying note 77 (citing the text of the Indenture).
197. See supra note 106 (citing the text of the Indenture).
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amended or eliminated.198
However, none of this is to say that the court’s ruling in Healthways
(i.e., the plaintiffs there merely stated a legally cognizable claim) will have
the effect of eliminating proxy puts entirely. It is more likely that
contracting parties will instead draft and adopt proxy puts that trigger upon
the unapproved stockholder election of a new board majority where all
directors have equal voting power. Including delay provisions risks
running afoul of Quickturn’s invalidation of “slow hand” poison pills, but
parties still may implement provisions requiring approval by a
supermajority vote.
Accordingly, following this Comment’s attempt to narrow Delaware’s
cases interpreting proxy puts and the likelihood that the court’s recent
decision in Healthways will fundamentally affect the nature of proxy puts
in the market, there is ample room to consider how Delaware should
regulate proxy puts in the future.
IV. RECHARACTERIZING PROXY PUTS
This Part considers how to regulate proxy puts by exploring the
device’s components and operation.199 Then, this Part questions the limited
extent to which proxy puts provide unique protection to creditors and
proposes narrowing the proper purpose of proxy puts to Identity Risk as a
concern distinct from Event Risk.
A.

Understanding the Components and Operation of Proxy Puts

As an initial matter, it must be noted that change of control covenants
are not the only covenants protecting lenders. Debt covenants cover a wide
range of circumstances and can be divided into several categories:
restrictions on the firm’s production/investment policy (including
restrictions on disposition of assets); restrictions on distributions
(including restrictions on the payment of dividends, share
purchases, and other forms of distribution); restrictions on

198. See supra text accompanying note 193.
199. For an argument that “embedded” change of control provisions like proxy puts in
bond indentures are unregulable, see Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley, Precommitment and
Managerial Incentives: Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of Shareholder Choice, 152 U.
PA. L. REV. 577, 602 (2003) (“[I]t is also neither desirable nor feasible to regulate such
defenses by allowing shareholders or courts (or both) to decide their fate ex post, once a
tender offer has emerged.”). However, as Amylin and SandRidge demonstrate, it is well
within the expertise of Delaware courts to regulate board decisions made in the ordinary
course of business that have an entrenching effect or touch on issues of control.
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subsequent financing (including limitations on issuing higherpriority debt and guarantees); modification of payoffs (including
sinking funds, conversion rights, and callability); and bonding
activities (including required reports, specification of accounting
standards, and officer certificates of compliance).200
However, as exemplified by the RJR Nabisco buyout discussed below,
traditional covenants alone proved inadequate to protecting lenders from
certain changes of control. An early generation of change of control
covenants, characterized as “poison puts” because they were intended to
make the company “indigestible for a hostile bidder”, triggered upon a
change of control not approved by the board of directors.201 But because
these covenants failed to protect against management-friendly transactions,
such as the RJR Nabisco buyout, a second generation of more
comprehensive “super poison puts” emerged,202 including limitations on
beneficial ownership, stock repurchases and special dividends, the transfer
or lease of assets, certain mergers or acquisitions, and significant changes
in board composition.203 The last of these most closely captures the proxy
puts that are the subject of this Comment.
To better understand the operation and impact of proxy puts, this
Comment turns to the scholarship of Professors Kahan and Klausner. In
Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder Protection or Management
Entrenchment?, Kahan and Klausner examined the development of change
of control covenants protecting bondholders in the wake of the 1988 RJR
Nabisco buyout.204 Despite the variety of covenants already protecting
bondholders in the event of certain changes in control, the buyout
announcement caused RJR Nabisco bondholders to suffer catastrophic
losses because the protections did not include management buyouts or
friendly mergers.205 As a result, lenders and corporations expanded the
scope of the change of control covenants protecting bondholders from
takeover-related losses. However, the expanded change of control
covenants also functioned as antitakeover measures that protected

200. See Rock, supra note 26, at 1930 (citing Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner,
On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118-19
(1979)).
201. F. John Stark et al., “Marriott Risk”: A New Model Covenant to Restrict Transfers
of Wealth from Bondholders to Stockholders, 1994 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 503, 568 (1994).
202. Id. at 569.
203. Id. at 573.
204. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder
Protection or Management Entrenchment?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 931 (1992/1993).
205. See id. at 980 (discussing the narrow change of control covenants in substantially
all bonds issued prior to the RJR Nabisco buyout).
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management at the expense of stockholders.206 Given the mixed efficiency
of these devices, Kahan and Klausner examined whether change of control
covenants in bond indentures enhance firm value and the potential for
management to use these provisions for entrenchment purposes. This
Comment relies on Kahan and Klausner’s description of how change of
control provisions operate and affect a firm’s agency costs of debt and
equity rather than the results of their empirical analysis.
Kahan and Klausner discussed two issues critical to understanding
proxy puts: a corporation’s agency costs of debt and equity, and the
triggers and remedies that define the way change of control covenants
operate. First, the authors situated change of control covenants in Jensen
and Meckling’s agency cost framework.207 There, a corporation’s agency
cost of debt “is a product of the conflicting interests of stockholders and
bondholders once bonds have been issued.”208 More specifically, riskaverse bondholders prefer the corporation to pursue a conservative business
strategy to maximize the likelihood of paying off its debt; in contrast,
stockholders prefer the corporation to pursue a riskier strategy to maximize
the unlimited gains on their investment. Thus, agency costs arise from the
“incentives for a company to engage in transactions that lower the value of
the firm but nevertheless increase shareholder wealth by shifting wealth
from bondholders to shareholders.”209
Importantly, these transactions include the debt-financed acquisitions
or leveraged recapitalizations that surround takeover-related activity.
When a company takes on high levels of debt, existing bondholders “bear a
large part of the company’s [increased] risk of failure, but . . . receive no
additional benefit if the company succeeds.”210 As a result, new
bondholders incorporate the risk of this additional leverage into the cost of
the company’s debt by either requiring higher interest rates or including
certain other restrictive covenants. To the extent that higher interest rates
fully compensate bondholders ex ante for the risk of harm flowing from
increased leverage associated with certain changes in control, bondholders
are indifferent as to whether a change occurs. However, since a higher cost
of debt decreases the value of the company, companies face an incentive to

206. See id. at 934–35 (discussing the differing view that the change of control
covenants are designed and implemented by management without shareholder approval to
protect management from hostile takeovers).
207. Id. at 938 (citing Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 333–43
(1976)).
208. Id. at 938.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 939.
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give up their right to engage in takeover-related activities associated with
higher leverage by entering into restrictive, protective covenants in
exchange for debt with lower interest rates. The authors state, “So long as
bondholders are paid interest rates that reflect the presence or absence of
covenant protection, they are indifferent to the extent of protection they are
given.”211
Kahan and Klausner also examined the impact of change of control
covenants on a company’s agency cost of equity. Agency costs of equity
arise from the conflict between stockholders’ sole interest in maximizing
the value of their shares and the personal interests of management to retain
control of the company.212 Generally, the market for corporate control
decreases a company’s agency cost of equity by both disciplining managers
to act in the best interest of stockholders by maximizing share value, and
replacing managers who fail to do so through hostile takeovers and proxy
contests.213 However, the market for corporate control primarily consists of
the same takeover-related, leverage-increasing events as those covered by
the change of control provisions protecting bondholders. Accordingly,
change of control covenants that protect not only bondholder interests but
also managements’ interests represent a trade-off between decreasing
agency costs of debt and increasing agency costs of equity.214 Kahan and
Klausner contrasted the boundaries of this trade-off as follows:
the bondholder-protective covenant that minimizes the agency
cost of debt and equity would cover all leveraged acquisitions
and recapitalizations and would provide compensation for no
more than the actual loss in bond values that occurs as a result of
the transaction. The ideal management-protective covenant, in
contrast, would cover only hostile acquisitions and proxy
challenges, and it would provide for a supra-compensatory
remedy in the event that either of these control changes occurs.
This covenant would both increase the firm’s agency cost of
equity and fail to achieve potential reductions in the agency cost

211. Id. at 939. See also Rock, supra note 26, at 1932 (“At issuance, many studies find
a negative relationship between the ex ante pricing of debt and the presence of covenants.”)
(citing Vidhan K Goyal, Market Discipline of Bank Risk: Evidence From Subordinated
Debt Contracts, 14 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 318, 334 (2005)); Natalia Reisel, On the Value
of Restrictive Covenants: An Empirical Investigation of Public Bond Issues 5–7 (Dec. 2004)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-644522).
212. Id. at 944 (citing Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 327–28
(1976)).
213. Id.
214. Id.
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of debt.215
Importantly, Kahan and Klausner noted that, because bondholders are
indifferent to changes in control when interest rates reflect the presence or
absence of protection, “[t]he underlying conflict regarding the terms of a
change of control covenant is thus the familiar one between managers and
shareholders.”216 Thus, managers draft change of control covenants to
benefit themselves in the following ways. First, managers who draft
covenants that fail to protect bondholders from harmful, managementfavored transactions (like management buyouts or leveraged
recapitalizations) fail to efficiently reduce the company’s agency cost of
debt.217 Since bondholders protect themselves by requiring higher interest
rates to account for the additional risk of harmful, management-favored
transactions, stockholders ultimately carry this additional cost through
higher costs of borrowing.
Second, managers draft covenants to
compensate bondholders for takeover-related events that cause no harm
whatsoever, but nevertheless threaten management’s interests and control
of the company.218 Finally, managers draft covenants to significantly
overcompensate bondholders for certain disfavored transactions in order to
deter takeover-related events that threaten their job security.219
The second issue critical to understanding proxy puts is the terms that
define change of control covenants generally. Change of control covenants
consist of a trigger and a remedy. Kahan and Klausner divided change of
control covenants into the following categories: Hostile Control Change
Covenants, Dual Trigger Covenants, and Pure Rating Decline Covenants.220
Additionally, the authors observed two remedies: the right to put debt back
to the company at par or at a premium and an adjustment on the interest
rate payable to the bondholder.221
Hostile Control Change Covenants are triggered by one of two
takeover-related events:
an unapproved acquisition of a specified
percentage of the company’s shares; or an unapproved proxy challenge
replacing a majority of the company’s directors.222 In both cases, approval
typically can be given “by the directors in office at the time the bonds were

215. Id. at 950.
216. Id. at 948.
217. Id. at 949.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 950.
220. Id. at 951.
221. Id. at 960.
222. Id. at 952–53. Although not described as such by Kahan and Klausner, an
unapproved proxy challenge replacing a majority of the company’s directors is a Proxy Put.
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issued or successors they have chosen . . . .”223 Because these covenants
only apply to transactions not approved by management and omit
management-favored, leveraged recapitalizations, “[t]he scope of
bondholder protection is thus narrowly limited to hostile acquisitions and
proxy challenges, the two ways in which stockholders can wrest control
from management.”224 When triggered, Hostile Control Change Covenants
typically provide the right to put the debt back to the company at par or at a
premium.225 However, this remedy does not compensate bondholders for
harm arising from the triggering event: if market interest rates had
declined enough prior to the event, the put would undercompensate a
bondholder; alternatively, if market interest rates had increased enough
prior to the event, the put would overcompensate a bondholder.226 In either
case, intervening market events, not bondholder protection against harm
arising from an unapproved acquisition of shares or a proxy challenge, will
largely determine the size of the remedy triggered by a Hostile Control
Change Covenant. Thus, despite the stated intent, Hostile Control Change
Covenants appear to protect directors more from the market for corporate
control than bondholders from harm arising from hostile changes of
control.
Dual Trigger Covenants, on the other hand, are triggered only when a
decline in a bond’s credit rating227 accompanies one of the following
events: (1) the acquisition of a specified percentage of the company’s
stock; (2) a successful proxy challenge replacing a majority of an
incumbent board by individuals not nominated by management; (3) a
merger, consolidation, or sale of substantially all of the corporation’s
assets; or (4) the payment of dividends or the repurchase of shares
exceeding a specified percentage of the company’s equity, or both, over the
course of one year.228 Kahan and Klausner found that most Dual Trigger

223. Id. at 952.
224. Id. at 954.
225. Id. at 960.
226. Id. at 963. Kahan and Klausner further explain the managerial interests reflected
by including puts in change of control covenants, stating:
This skewing of compensation under a put at par is particularly evident in the
case of a proxy challenge or a hostile acquisition by a financially strong
acquirer – two transactions that are unlikely to reduce bond values substantially,
if at all. Because bondholders rarely suffer losses as a result of these
transactions, the predominant potential impact of a put at par is to provide
overcompensation (that is, if market rates have risen).
Id. at 965.
227. Id. at 955–56. To contribute to a trigger, a bond’s rating must fall either from
investment grade or a full rating category. Id.
228. Id. at 955. Kahan and Klausner note that sometimes a successful proxy challenge
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Covenants included a put at par, although some included an interest rate
adjustment determined by a schedule in the covenant relating specific
interest rates to changes in credit ratings.229 According to Kahan and
Klausner, because Dual Trigger Covenants protect against most takeoverrelated events, they “offer substantially more complete coverage to
bondholders than do Hostile Control Change Covenants.”230 Also, even
though the put remedy is less efficient than the interest rate adjustment,
Dual Trigger Covenants “relate the availability of a remedy more closely to
transactions that actually cause a reduction in bond values[.]”231
Nevertheless, these covenants still reflect managerial interests by including
proxy contests, which alone merely remove management and cause little
harm to bondholders.232
Finally, Pure Rating Decline Covenants automatically adjust the
interest rate payable to bondholders upon an increase or decrease in the
bond’s credit rating, regardless of whether the change corresponds with a
takeover-related event.233 Pure Rating Decline Covenants “contain the
most direct link between the remedy and losses in bond values” and reflect
no influence of management interests.234 However, they also “impose on a
corporation the risk of credit quality deterioration that is completely outside
the control of corporate management, such as problems attributable to
increased competition.”235 Kahan and Klausner suggest these covenants are
rare because they create management inflexibility that is adverse to both
stockholders and bondholders.236
Kahan and Klausner’s analysis of antitakeover provisions in bonds
illustrates two issues critical to understanding proxy puts. First, the agency
cost of debt arising from takeover-related transactions provides
opportunities for companies to reduce their cost of debt and increase
stockholder value by utilizing change of control covenants. However,
because change of control covenants concern management’s exposure to
the market for corporate control, managers are incentivized to draft these
covenants in their best interest rather than in the company’s best interest,
resulting in both a failure to decrease their company’s agency cost of debt

replacing a majority of the incumbent board is not included in a Dual Trigger Covenant, and
sometimes a major asset acquisition by the company is included.
229. Id. at 961.
230. Id. at 956.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 957.
233. Id. at 958–59.
234. Id. at 959.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 960.
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and ultimately an increase in their company’s agency cost of equity.237
Second, managers draft change of control provisions to benefit their
interests and harm stockholders in several ways. In particular, managers
design triggers to protect against changes of control that are not likely to
harm bondholders, like successful proxy challenges, and to exclude
management-favored transactions that will harm bondholders. To deter
unfriendly changes of control, managers also design remedies that either
compensate bondholders who have not been harmed or overcompensate
bondholders for harm actually suffered.
Importantly, the price of bonds reflects the extent of protective
covenants.238 In other words, a bondholder seeks to make themselves
indifferent between either receiving lower interest rates ex ante and a
remedy equal to harm suffered in the event of a triggering change of
control or receiving higher interest rates ex ante with no remedy in the
event of a change of control. Thus, while bondholders might receive a
windfall from an overbroad or overcompensatory provision, there is little
reason to assume a bondholder would accept a lower interest rate ex ante in
exchange for the mere chance at a windfall remedy—and no reason to
assume a bondholder would accept a lower interest rate ex ante in exchange
for a provision that fails to protect against other genuinely harmful takeover
events.
Kahan and Klausner’s analysis leaves the benefit of proxy puts to
agency costs of debt and equity, and thus to stockholders, on narrow
ground. Without an accompanying decline in credit rating, proxy puts are
Hostile Control Change Covenants. When proxy puts are included in debt
agreements, successful proxy challenges trigger proxy puts and provide
debt holders the remedy of putting their debt back to the company. But as

237. See supra text accompanying note 215 (illustrating the poor incentive structures
that lead managers to draft covenants in their own best interests as opposed to the
company’s best interest).
238. Id. at 939 (arguing that “So long as bondholders are paid interest rates that reflect
the presence or absence of covenant protection, they are indifferent to the extent of
protection they are given.”); see also, Rock, supra note 26 at 1932 (stating “(1) creditor
protection is associated with lower promised yields at issue; and (2) there is a significant
negative relation between credit spreads and the degree of covenant protection, controlling
for issuer and bond issue characteristics”) (citing Chenyang Wei, Covenant Protection,
Credit Spread Dynamics and Managerial Incentives 13–18 (Nov. 29, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~cwei/JobMarket_CovenantsSpreadCEOIncentive_ChenyangWei
.pdf); Rock, supra note 26 at 1934 (citing Matthew T. Billet, Zhan Jiang & Erik Lie, The
Effect of Change-in-Control Covenants on Takeovers: Evidence from Leveraged Buyouts,
16 J. CORP. FIN. 1, 6 tbl.2, 11 (2010) (providing evidence that in the 2000s, change of
control covenants used in 41% of bonds were associated with gains to bondholders of 2.3%
compared to losses to bondholders of 6.8% in bonds without change of control covenants).
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Kahan and Klausner point out, successful proxy challenges alone pose little
threat to debt holders for which they would require protection.239 Instead,
the larger risk to debt holders associated with successful proxy challenges
arises from the newly elected board’s later decision to engage in debtfinanced or takeover-related activity. But since proxy puts do not provide
debt holders with direct protection from harm arising from leverageincreasing events subsequent to successful proxy challenges, debt holders
protect themselves from these events with higher interest rates or other
restrictive covenants.240
By implication, because debt holders benefit only marginally, if at all,
from additional takeover-related protection in proxy puts, it is unlikely that
companies derive substantial benefits from granting them.241 In this
respect, stockholders do not benefit from proxy puts because proxy puts
exact a toll on stockholders’ voting rights without a corresponding decrease
in the company’s cost of borrowing and agency cost of debt. Furthermore,
by providing an overcompensatory put remedy, proxy puts tend to shield
managers from the market for corporate control and thereby increase the
company’s agency cost of equity. It is evident that entrenchment may be
the primary purpose of proxy puts.
To better illustrate how limited the protective value of a proxy put is
to a lender, compare two extremes: debt protected only by a proxy put and
no other covenants; and debt protected by a wide range of protective
covenants but no proxy put. First, in the absence of additional protective
covenants, a proxy put provides no creditor protection from nearly any
action the incumbent board could take, including engaging in management-

239. Id. at 950. This is explained by Kahan and Klausner’s observation that
bondholders will protect themselves by pricing any unprotected risk of harm into the interest
rate on bonds. Id. at 939. Because proxy puts do not provide bondholders with additional
protection from takeover-related events, bondholders have no incentive to reduce the
interest rate. Thus, broad proxy puts tend to benefit bondholders at the expense of
stockholders. Instead, the benefit flows to management by shielding them from the market
for corporate control. Id. at 949.
240. In fact, the RJR Nabisco buyout itself illustrates the risk of harm to bondholders
that Hostile Control Change Covenants (like proxy puts) leave unprotected: because the RJR
Nabisco buyout resulted from a bidding war between a highly-leveraged management-led
buyout and a highly-leveraged friendly acquisition, neither non-hostile buyout triggered a
bondholder-protective remedy. Similarly, a proxy put alone would not compensate
bondholders for harm suffered if incumbent management themselves decided to leverage the
company and buy back shares or distribute a cash dividend to defend against a proxy
challenge.
241. Debt holders undoubtedly benefit when proxy puts compensate them despite a lack
of harm. See supra, text accompanying note 213. However, this benefit is an unbargainedfor windfall to the debt holder representing a direct transfer of wealth from stockholders to
bondholders.
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friendly changes of control. For example, the board could dilute the value
of the creditor’s fixed claim on the assets of the company by spinning off a
subsidiary or distributing assets to shareholders or by substituting more
risky assets for less risky assets; alternatively, the board could decide to
change the capital structure of the company by increasing leverage.242
Given that this list likely includes nearly everything that could happen in
the life of a company, other than the shareholders choosing to elect a new
board majority without the incumbent board’s approval, the creditor faces
an enormous risk of harm that the proxy put cannot prevent. By way of
analogy, a proxy put protects creditors from harm to the same extent the
front door insulates a home from the cold: it doesn’t matter how tightly
you bolt it shut if all the other doors and windows are left open. It is
difficult to imagine a creditor conferring a material benefit on a company in
exchange for this kind of protection.
In the alternative, consider a creditor that is concerned about its
borrower dramatically changing its capital structure, significantly diluting
its assets, taking too many risks, or becoming the target of a leveraged buyout. Instead of a proxy put, this creditor negotiated with its borrower for
covenants restricting its ability to materially change its capital structure by
increasing leverage, decreasing equity, spinning-off or selling all or
substantially all of its assets, and for protection against both a credit rating
downgrade and the company reporting an interest coverage ratio below a
negotiated threshold. By design, the creditor is protected from just about
any foreseeable event that would materially reduce the likelihood that its
borrower will repay its debt. In addition, the borrower was able to obtain a
lower interest rate as consideration for agreeing to the covenants protecting
the lender; thus, both parties benefit from the covenant. However, seeking
to refinance its debt with the creditor, presumably for the purpose of further
reducing its cost of borrowing, the company proposes to add the only
protection the creditor doesn’t already have: a proxy put. How would the
proxy put increase the creditor’s protection from harm? Any new board
majority would be just as subject to the creditor’s existing protection as the
incumbent board is. As such, the creditor is already protected from any
material increase in the risk that the company would not be able to repay its
debt arising from stockholders electing a new board majority.
This hypothetical is not meant to reflect current market trends, but
rather that the amount of protection uniquely provided by proxy puts is
limited, notwithstanding the Delaware Court of Chancery’s analysis in
SandRidge. Nevertheless, there is evidence suggesting that lenders in fact

242. See Rock, supra note 26, at 1927 (describing how shareholders externalize risk
onto creditors and other fixed claimants).
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place no value on proxy puts.243 The next section of this Comment
proposes a distinction designed to enable Delaware to better regulate proxy
puts.
B.

Distinguishing Identity Risk From Event Risk

The “proxy put” label can be characterized broadly or narrowly.
Under the court’s broad characterization of proxy puts in SandRidge, the
“proxy” label most accurately captures the device’s duplicative function as
a distant proxy for protection against multiple possible harms arising from
leverage-increasing or takeover-related events taking place after
stockholders elect a new board majority by directly and substantially
interfering with the shareholder franchise itself. Instead, the “proxy put”
label could be narrowly characterized as a description of the device’s
operative provisions and an honest recognition of its purpose of protecting
against unique risks arising from proxy fights. Adopting a narrow
characterization, as this Comment proposes, suggests the clearest answer to
whether a board has the authority to bind the corporation to a change of
control provision designed to prevent stockholders from electing a new
board of directors: as the court held in Blasius, a board has no such
authority absent a compelling justification.244
Because the limited
protection that a proxy put uniquely provides contrasts with the potentially
unlimited cost of the device to the stockholder franchise, this Comment
proposes defining the proper purpose of proxy puts to be as narrow as the
limited protection that a proxy put uniquely provides. More precisely, this
Comment proposes (1) defining the proper purpose of proxy puts to be
providing protection against Identity Risk and (2) attaching a rebuttable
presumption that proxy puts are disenfranchising.
Kahan and Klausner define “Event Risk” as “the risk that an event
will occur that results in a sudden change in a corporation’s credit quality

243. See, e.g., Joseph A. Fields, David S. Kidwell & Linda S. Klein, Coupon Resets
Versus Poison Puts: The Valuation of Event Risk Provisions in Corporate Debt, 3 FIN.
SERV. REV. 143 (1994); Leland Crabbe, Event Risk: An Analysis of Losses to Bondholders
and “Super Poison Put” Bond Covenants, 46 J. FIN. 689 (1991) (attributing 24 basis points
in value primarily to a change in beneficial ownership and a credit rating decline); MOODY’S
REP. NO. 98985, REQUEST FOR COMMENT ON MOODY’S INDENTURE COVENANT RESEARCH &
ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK (2006) (omitting proxy puts as a relevant or valuable form of
creditor protection); Moody’s Rep. No. 108526, CREDIT ROUNDTABLE ADOPTS A CONTRACTBASED APPROACH TO MITIGATING RISK, (2008), at 5 n. 15 (describing proxy puts as
“[d]esigned to address hostile takeovers, this ‘event’ prong is not particularly useful.”).
These reports are in stark contrast to the court’s consistent characterization of proxy puts in
SandRidge as protecting creditors’ legitimate interests in getting paid.
244. Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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but that cannot be predicted using the tools of credit analysis.”245 This
definition “includes not only financial transactions such as leveraged
buyouts, spin-offs and restructurings but also a variety of other
extraordinary events such as major litigations, casualty losses and the
like.”246 For present purposes, Event Risk might as well be defined so
broadly that it includes the risk that any event will occur resulting in a
sudden change in a corporation’s credit quality. The only thing that Event
Risk should not include is Identity Risk.
As defined here, Identity Risk arises from proxy fights, but contrasts
with Event Risk in that it is not concerned with what legitimate actions a
newly elected board majority might take. It is instead narrowly concerned
with risks related to the identity of the individuals in question.247 By way
of example, the court in SandRidge identified several risks to creditors
posed by a rival proxy slate: “the proposed new board consists of ‘known
looters’ or persons of suspect integrity[;]” or “the insurgent slate could
have plans for the company posing a genuine and specific threat to the
corporation[.]”248 Although Event Risk likely encompasses “plans for the
company,” Identity Risk carves out the risk of harm arising from
stockholders electing a new board majority consisting of “known looters”
or persons of suspect integrity.249
Distinguishing Identity Risk from Event Risk is consistent with
Delaware law. In Delaware, the stockholders of a corporation elect its
directors.250 According to Blasius, this continues to be true even when a
rival slate’s “proposal was or is unrealistic and would lead to injury to the
corporation and its shareholders if pursued.”251 Critically, the court
clarified that while it may be true that “the board knows better than do the
shareholders what is in the corporation’s best interest[] . . . for any number
of matters, it is irrelevant . . . when the question is who should comprise the
board of directors.”252 Thus, notwithstanding the Event Risk posed by a
rival slate’s proposal, a board may not interfere with the shareholder
franchise without a compelling justification.253 Even without the proposed

245. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 204, at 934 n.5 (defining “event risk”).
246. See Stark et al., supra note 201 (describing a broad definition of “event risk”).
247. For the avoidance of doubt, Identity Risk is concerned with the identity of
nominees on a rival slate, not the stockholder nominating the rival slate.
248. SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 260.
249. The substance of this proposed definition is intentionally limited to one of the
strongest justifications for interfering with the stockholder franchise, but experience will no
doubt permit the definition to expand.
250. 8 Del. C. § 211(b).
251. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 663.
252. Id. at 663.
253. Id. at 659.
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presumption that proxy puts are disenfranchising, a broadly framed proxy
put characterized as being concerned with Event Risk is arguably
disenfranchising on its face, notwithstanding the chancery court’s prior
decisions to the contrary.254 By contrast, a proxy put concerned only with
Identity Risk, that is, the narrow risk of harm arising from a new board
majority consisting of known looters or persons of suspect integrity,
arguably satisfies Blasius’s compelling justification standard with ease.
Because of this, attaching a disenfranchising presumption is both consistent
with Blasius and easily rebutted by a board defending a narrow proxy put.
In addition to being consistent with Delaware law, separating Identity
Risk from Event Risk as the proper purpose of proxy puts is useful in
several ways. First, it provides a clear signal to the market that the court is
willing to presume a proxy put is disenfranchising on its face. This will put
boards on notice that they will have to demonstrate a compelling
justification for triggering proxy puts in order to satisfy their fiduciary
duties. Plus, the threat of being subject to compelling justification review
will incentivize boards to amend the proxy puts to which their company is a
party in order to decrease the extent to which they are concerned with
Identity Risk. For example, a dual trigger covenant providing a creditor
with an interest rate adjustment remedy upon the reduction in the credit
rating of its borrower shortly after a change in board majority is arguably
more concerned with the credit rating Event Risk than the proxy fight risk
and thus not likely to reviewed under Blasius. This contrasts with a
provision that automatically triggers a put remedy above par upon the
election of an unapproved new board majority, which would probably be a
facially invalid abdication of a board’s fiduciary duties or, at minimum,
subject to Blasius review in all circumstances. Thus, the threat of being
subjected to compelling justification review will encourage directors to
focus change of control provisions on the best interests of the company and
its stockholders instead of their own.
Second, separating Identity Risk from Event Risk will provide clarity
not only as to the proper standard of review for proxy puts, but also as to
the proper standard of review for broader change of control covenants.
Even though the court has reviewed proxy puts under Unocal “with a

254. See, e.g., Hills Stores Co. v. Bozic, 769 A.2d 88, 90 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“The
plaintiffs are estopped from arguing and have produced no evidence that the Employment
Areements were entered into for the ‘primary purpose of thwarting the exercise of a
stockholder vote.’”); Kallick v. SandRidge Energy, Inc., 68 A.3d 242, 258 (Del. Ch. 2013)
(“But the standard of review Blasius offers does little to address situations like this, where a
contractual provision cannot be said to have the ‘sole or primary purpose’ of impeding the
stockholders’ vote . . . .”).
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special sensitivity towards the stockholder franchise[,]”255 the simple fact is
that Blasius and Liquid Audio still create ambiguity as to when the court
might adopt a higher standard. Thus, carving out Identity Risk would
increase clarity as to the circumstances under which the court will conduct
a compelling justification review.
Third, despite limiting the proper purpose of certain proxy puts, the
proposed distinction is not a per se invalidation of the device. This is
consistent with Delaware’s preference against per se rules.256
Finally, juxtaposing Identity Risk and Event Risk will focus both the
court and boards of directors on a more thorough consideration of the broad
contractual context in which proxy puts appear. For example, a board
determining for purposes of a proxy put whether to approve a rival slate
planning to conduct a leveraged share repurchase like in Hills might
reasonably choose not to do so because the creditor is better protected by a
covenant restricting the rival slate’s ability either to change the company’s
capital structure after its election or to repurchase a substantial amount of
shares. And because neither party expected the proxy put to protect from
leveraged share repurchases, declining to trigger the remedy would not be a
breach of the proxy put.
V.

DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK OF REVIEW FOR PROXY PUTS

In Hills, Amylin, SandRidge, and Healthways, Delaware began laying
the foundation for a framework of review, but more work is necessary to
achieve clarity and utility in future cases concerning proxy puts. This
Comment set out to address two primary questions left unanswered in
SandRidge by narrowing the court’s characterizations of both Amylin and
proxy puts. After exploring the components and agency costs of change of
control provisions, this Comment questioned the extent to which proxy puts
add unique protection to creditors and proposed narrowing the proper
purpose of proxy puts to Identity Risk as a concern distinct from Event
Risk. In this Part, this Comment develops the structure of a framework of
review assuming Identity Risk is the proper purpose of proxy puts with the
goal of exploring the extent to which the framework provides a means to
regulating shareholder-creditor agency costs related to proxy puts.
Distinguishing Identity Risk from Event Risk parallels distinguishing
Blasius from Unocal: as the court recognized in Blasius, it is irrelevant

255. SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 259.
256. See, e.g., In re Ancestry.com Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7988-CS, transcript
(Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012) (“Per se rulings where judges invalidate contractual provisions
across the bar are exceedingly rare in Delaware, and they should be.”).
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whether a board’s actions are proportionate to a threat conceived in good
faith when it comes to deciding who should comprise the board of
directors. And the supreme court was just as clear in Liquid Audio when it
held that demonstrating a compelling justification for action taken with the
primary purpose of interfering with a stockholder election is a condition
precedent to any determination of the action’s reasonableness.257 Yes,
actions taken to protect against Identity Risk are by their nature defensive;
but because protecting against that risk requires interfering with the
stockholder franchise, the primary purpose of those defensive actions is
presumptively disenfranchising. By implication, then, distinguishing
Identity Risk from Event Risk attaches the presumption of a primary
purpose to disenfranchise and suggests some form of compelling
justification review. Therefore, this Comment adopts the Liquid Audio
standard of review for proxy puts as a means to considering both the
disenfranchising presumption and the proportionality of a board’s actions
in relation to Identity Risk.
As will be shown, incorporating Identity Risk into a Liquid Audio
standard of review simplifies the analysis of proxy puts by focusing
narrowly on whether a proxy put was adopted to protect against Identity
Risk, whether its trigger is limited to protecting against Identity Risk, and
whether the board demonstrates a good faith belief informed by compelling
evidence that a rival slate poses a threat arising from Identity Risk before
triggering the device. Within this framework, the validity of a board’s
decisions to adopt and exercise a proxy put has a firm basis in Delaware
corporate law, both in terms of the board’s authority to adopt the device
and the proportionality of the device’s trade-off between the stockholders’,
creditors’, and company’s interests under the circumstances. Finally,
creditors also benefit from the framework’s clear demarcation of a board’s
authority to adopt and exercise proxy puts.
This Part proceeds as follows. Section A considers a board’s possible
responses to a disenfranchising presumption. Section B outlines how
fiduciary duty claims would be reviewed and Section C outlines how
contract claims would be reviewed, both with a focus on Identity Risk.
Section D explores extending the framework. Section E looks back at prior
cases.
A.

Satisfying Identity Risk’s Disenfranchising Presumption

The Blasius standard incorporated into Liquid Audio has two parts:
primary purpose and compelling justification. Thus, a board attempting to

257. MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003).
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satisfy the disenfranchising presumption can attack both parts. First, a
board that adopted a proxy put for the primary purpose of protecting
against Identity Risk should concede that the proxy put is disenfranchising
and instead focus on demonstrating that the proxy put provides protection
against known looters or persons of suspect integrity that might take over
the board through a proxy fight. Second, a board could also seek to rebut
that the primary purpose of adopting the proxy put was disenfranchising.
For example, the primary purpose of the Severance agreements in Hills was
to prevent the covered executives from quitting in the face of Dickstein’s
hostile takeover attempts. In either case, the board is best served by clear
evidence of its purpose in adopting the proxy put. Rebutting the
presumption is not meant to be difficult, but to incentivize boards to
document their negotiations and deliberations leading up to their adoption
or exercise of a proxy put.
However, the path that the board chooses impacts the subsequent
analysis. By rebutting the presumption, the ordinary Unocal standards
would apply. Alternatively, by conceding that the primary purpose of the
proxy put is disenfranchising, certain portions of the analysis would be
influenced by Blasius’s compelling justification standard, as demonstrated
below.
B.

Reviewing Fiduciary Duty Claims

As established in Moran and recognized in SandRidge, both a board’s
decision to adopt a change of control provision and a board’s decision to
trigger the change of control provision are challengeable.258 In addition, as
stated above, this Comment adopts the Liquid Audio standard of review for
proxy puts.
1.

Challenging A Board’s Decision to Adopt a Proxy Put

A board’s decision to adopt a proxy put would be reviewed under
Liquid Audio’s unified standard. Under Liquid Audio review, rebutting the
disenfranchising presumption satisfies the standard’s condition precedent to
questions of proportionality and reasonableness. Afterwards, the familiar
two-prong Unocal standard applies. As an initial matter, by narrowing the
proper purpose of a proxy put to protecting against Identity Risk, the
grounds on which a board may validly defend its decision to adopt a proxy
put are similarly narrow. A board would support its decision to adopt the

258. SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 259 (citing Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346
(Del. 1985)).
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proxy put one of two ways.
Either the board would rebut the
disenfranchising presumption by demonstrating that the proxy put was
adopted for a purpose other than protecting against Identity Risk and
thereafter demonstrate that the proxy put’s components are proportionate to
its purpose. Or the board would concede that the proxy put was adopted
for the primary purpose of disenfranchising and instead demonstrate that
the proxy put’s components are proportionate to a compelling
justification—something it should be able to do with ease as protecting
against Identity Risk justifies a much larger remedy.
A stockholder challenging the validity of the board’s decision to adopt
the proxy puts would only be able to do so by demonstrating that the proxy
put is not proportionate to the purpose for which it was adopted. However,
a stockholder would be able to argue against the board’s purported purpose
for adopting the proxy put in order to challenge its proportionality against a
different standard: a proxy put adopted to protect against Identity Risk
would be disproportionate if its trigger prevents more than the election of
known looters or persons of suspect integrity or if its remedy provides a
creditor with significantly more than the basic right to put its debt back to
the company at par.
Unocal review would proceed as follows. Applying the first prong to
a board’s decision to adopt a proxy put is simple: did the board have an
informed, good faith belief that the proxy put protects against Identity
Risk?259
Alternatively, if the board rebutted the disenfranchising
presumption by demonstrating that protecting against Identity Risk was not
the primary purpose of the challenged proxy put, the board would only
have to demonstrate that it had an informed, good faith belief that
something posed a threat to the company, even if the threat does not arise
from Identity Risk.
Second, the board would have to demonstrate that the proxy put
operates in proportion to its proper purpose. Kahan and Klausner’s
description of a proxy put’s operative provisions, as well as the Amylin
court’s insistence that a board receive extraordinary consideration for
granting a proxy put, identify three components that inform Unocal’s
proportionality review: the proxy put’s trigger and remedy, and the
consideration the company received.
Notwithstanding the court’s
comments in Amylin, however, the clear protection a proxy put also gives
the company against Identity Risk suggests that a proxy put has defensive
259. This would also satisfy Schnell’s concern that board action be taken for a proper
purpose; in this case, protecting against Identity Risk is a proxy put’s only proper purpose.
See Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) (finding against board
actions taken for “inequitable purposes [and] contrary to established principles of corporate
democracy”).
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value independent of any bargained-for benefit negotiated from a creditor.
In other words, because both a company and its creditors benefit from a
proxy put’s protection against Identity Risk, the board need not necessarily
extract additional concessions from its counterparty.
If a board seeks to include a proxy put, the board’s informed, good
faith belief that it is in the best interest of the company and its stockholders
to give itself a lever to deter known looters or persons of suspect integrity
from winning a board majority would alone be a compelling justification.
When the board adopts a proxy put for its independent value, this trade-off
between protecting the company from Identity Risk and the stockholder’s
fundamental right to elect the board can only be proportionate if the trigger
is narrowly tailored to protecting against Identity Risk, because only when
protecting against Identity Risk is the put remedy reasonable in relation to
the threat posed. Thus, a proxy put adopted in good faith and on an
informed basis for its independent defensive value satisfies Liquid Audio’s
condition precedent to Unocal review if its trigger is narrowly tailored to
protecting against Identity Risk and similarly satisfies Unocal’s
proportionality review. Alternatively, if a creditor seeks to include a proxy
put, the board should consider whether its independent value is worth the
cost to the stockholder franchise and attempt to negotiate for additional
concessions as urged by the court in Amylin.
Notwithstanding a proxy put’s independent value, as suggested
previously and discussed by Kahan and Klausner, a proxy put might also be
adopted for mixed purposes exceeding Identity Risk and be structured to
trigger under circumstances other than the unapproved election of a new
board majority. Even though related to Identity Risk, the proportionality of
these mixed-purpose proxy puts is discussed in greater detail in Section D
below.
As an additional claim, the court acknowledged in Healthways its
willingness to consider a device’s deterrent effect on the stockholder
franchise to be an ongoing, actionable harm.260 This analysis would closely
follow the adoption analysis with a focus on whether the remedy’s
deterrent effect is disproportionate to the proxy put’s purpose. However,
assuming the board reserved discretion to approve a rival slate that does not
consist of known looters or persons of suspect integrity, a stockholder
arguably could not be deterred from nominating a rival slate unless and
until the board acts to disapprove the slate (in which case the stockholder’s
claim would relate to the board’s exercise of its approval), or refuses to act
one way or another (in which case the stockholder’s claim would be that
the board is acting in bad faith as demonstrated by SandRidge itself). In

260. Healthways Transcript, at 78–80.
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any event, narrowing the proper purpose of proxy puts to Identity Risk
would also narrow the court’s deterrence analysis in Healthways by
narrowing the circumstances under which a stockholder might be deterred.
Finally, a proxy put with an automatic trigger would have a much stronger
deterrence effect and, as discussed above, is arguably a facially invalid
abdication of a board’s fiduciary duties or, at minimum, would require the
board to rebut the disenfranchising presumption in all circumstances.
2.

Challenging a Board’s Decision to Trigger a Proxy Put

A board’s decision to exercise its discretion under a proxy put would
be similarly reviewed under a Liquid Audio standard, but the framework
differs in two respects: the good faith prong should be ratcheted up by the
compelling justification standard261 and the proportionality prong would
necessarily require an adoption analysis. First, considering the narrow
basis for validly adopting a proxy put, the only unique board action
separating its contractual duty to its creditors and its fiduciary duties to the
company and its stockholders is its informed, good faith belief that the rival
slate consists of known looters or persons of suspect integrity. As
suggested above, the board’s burdens of production and persuasion here
would be influenced by the compelling justification standard. Given the
potentially staggering consequences of triggering a validly adopted proxy
put, a board’s informed, good faith belief that electing the rival slate would
pass control of the company to known looters or persons of suspect
integrity should be supported by compelling evidence. In other words, in
order to rebut the disenfranchising presumption after conceding primary
purpose, the board should have to demonstrate that it formed its good faith
belief based on compelling evidence justifying the magnitude of its
decision to trigger the put remedy. As demonstrated in Section C below,
this determination also relates to a counterparty’s potential claim that the
board breached its duty of contract. In either case, requiring compelling
evidence provides the board with a strong basis for defending against
fiduciary duty claims and creates a high hurdle for creditors suing in
contract to overcome.
Second, a board cannot validly exercise an invalidly adopted proxy
put. Thus, assuming the board demonstrated that it had reached an
informed, good faith belief based on compelling evidence that the rival
slate posed a threat to the company arising from Identity Risk, the
proportionality analysis would necessarily shift its focus to the board’s

261. For mixed-purpose proxy puts, discussed infra part VI.D., the good faith prong is
not ratcheted up by the compelling justification standard.

ARTICLE 7 (MIXON).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1364

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

9/29/15 2:22 PM

[Vol. 17:4

decision to adopt the proxy put in the first place. As an initial matter, the
board would already have shown that the threat posed is proportionate to
the trigger itself by demonstrating its informed, good faith belief that the
threat arises from Identity Risk. Beyond that, however, whether the
remedy and consideration are proportionate to the proper purpose of
protecting against Identity Risk necessarily requires a record of the board’s
negotiations and deliberations leading to the proxy put’s adoption. Because
a board’s decision to trigger a proxy put after satisfying the good faith
prong is a contractual duty, it is thus independent from a contemporaneous
conclusion that the remedy and consideration are disproportionate. In order
for the remedy and consideration to be proportionate at exercise, they must
have been proportionate at adoption.262 The contours of this analysis are set
forth above and thus not repeated here.
The trade-off between stockholder, company, and creditor interests by
its nature places the board under enormous pressure. Upon considering
whether to trigger a proxy put, a board should recognize that it will
probably be sued, either by stockholders or by creditors, regardless of its
conclusion. The goal of this Identity Risk framework, however, is not to
create a jump ball scenario in which it would never be clear to creditors or
stockholders when proxy puts may be validly adopted or exercised.
Instead, the goal is to incentivize boards to adopt and exercise proxy puts
for the (proposed) proper purpose of protecting against Identity Risk and to
document both negotiations and deliberations leading to their decision to
do so. If negotiated, deliberated, and documented appropriately, a board
reduces the risk of liability to either party. First, as the counterparty to the
proxy put, a creditor should never have any doubt as to why the proxy put
was adopted and should have the same evidence as the board as to whether
a rival slate poses a threat arising from Identity Risk. A mere difference of
opinion is resolved in favor of the board, both in contractual and fiduciary
terms.263

262. Incidentally, this follows from Hills, where the court estopped the plaintiff from
challenging the proportionality of the board’s decision to trigger the Severance agreements
because the plaintiff had contractually waived its right to challenge the proportionality of
the board’s decision to adopt the agreements in the first place. See Hills Stores Co. v. Bozic,
769 A.2d 88, 107 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“The plaintiffs cannot in good faith claim that the
Severance is a disproportionate response in a situation when the Hills board, on a good faith
and informed basis, concluded that a Change in Control was adverse to the interests of Hills
and its stockholders. To find otherwise would be to say that the plaintiffs waived nothing
when they agreed not to challenge the adoption of the Employment Agreements.”).
263. That is, the contract expressly grants the board the right to exercise its discretion as
to whether the rival slate poses Identity Risk. Furthermore, a board arguably lacks authority
to adopt a proxy put that grants the creditor its fiduciary duty to determine whether a rival
slate poses an Identity Risk to the company and its stockholders.
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Second, a board should disclose to its stockholders that it adopted a
proxy put, its narrow purpose for doing so, and the narrow circumstances in
which the board would be required to trigger the proxy put.
Fundamentally, however, when facing competing fiduciary and contract
claims, the board’s contractual duty to trigger the proxy put would be
consistent with its fiduciary duties to the company and its stockholders.
Such is the purpose of narrowing the validity of proxy puts to protecting
against Identity Risk: the stockholders’, creditors’, and company’s
interests under the circumstances would be aligned. Whether a board has
breached its contractual duty to trigger a proxy put is discussed in the
following Section.
C.

Reviewing Contract Claims

A creditor’s claim that the company breached its contractual duty
under a proxy put will only arise from a board’s decision to approve a rival
slate and neutralize the creditor’s put remedy. Determining whether a
board exercised its discretion under a proxy put in breach of its contractual
duties turns first on whether the proxy put actually grants the board such
power. As suggested in Amylin and Healthways, a board’s adoption of a
proxy put with an automatic trigger denying the board power to neutralize
the remedy is arguably a facial abdication of its fiduciary duties to the
company and its stockholders or, at minimum, is invalid without a
compelling justification.264 For present purposes, however, this Comment
considers only proxy puts that grant power to the board to exercise its
discretion and determine whether to trigger the proxy put’s remedy.
The test in Amylin for whether a board has the contractual right to
approve a proxy put was clarified above.265 The test has two parts: A
board has the contractual right under a proxy put to approve a rival slate if
(1) the board determines on an informed, good faith basis that passing
control to the rival slate would not be a breach of its duty of loyalty to the
company or its stockholders, and (2) approving the rival slate is not a
breach of its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Defining
Identity Risk as the proper purpose of proxy puts would also attach the
disenfranchising presumption to whether the board has the right to approve
a rival slate. The disenfranchising presumption focuses the first part of this
test on whether the board’s informed, good faith belief was based on
compelling evidence and the second part of this test on whether the board

264. Amylin, 983 A.2d 304, 315 nn. 31–32 (Del. Ch. 2009); Healthways Transcript at
75, 80–81.
265. See discussion, supra part II.B.
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has deprived the creditor of its bargained-for protection.
In contrast to a fiduciary duty claim, here a board would defend its
decision to approve the rival slate and neutralize the proxy put one of two
ways. First, the board would argue that the proxy put was adopted to
protect against Identity Risk, but that it lacks compelling evidence to
believe in good faith that the rival slate poses a threat arising from Identity
Risk. For example, a board may have determined in good faith that passing
control to the rival slate would be a breach of its duty of loyalty to the
company—yet also determine in good faith that the threat posed by the
rival slate does not relate to the creditor’s bargained-for protection from
Identity Risk. In such a situation, a board has the right to approve the rival
slate for purposes of the proxy put without frustrating the device’s purpose
of protecting the creditor from Identity Risk.266 Signaling the likelihood of
this outcome would incentivize creditors to protect themselves from Event
Risk with covenants more narrowly designed to do so. Second, the board
may have compelling evidence that the rival slate poses a threat arising
from Identity Risk, but argue that it has no duty to trigger the put remedy
because it was not adopted to protect against such a risk. Because this
Comment proposes that protecting against Identity Risk should be the only
proper purpose of a proxy put, this second argument depends on the device
in question being something other than a proxy put. As such, discussion of
that possibility is reserved to Section D below.
A creditor would make the opposite arguments: either the proxy put
was adopted to protect against Identity Risk and the board acted in bad
faith by ignoring compelling evidence that the rival slate posed such a
threat; or, the device in question was not adopted to protect against Identity
Risk so the board’s duty to trigger the device does not require compelling
evidence, and thus the board acted in bad faith by denying the creditor
otherwise valid bargained-for protection. Again, this second argument
depends on the device in question being something other than a proxy put
and is discussed in greater detail below.
This contractual analysis purposefully mirrors the fiduciary duty
analysis above. In order for the board to validly trigger a proxy put without
breaching its fiduciary duties, the proxy put must have been designed and
adopted for the primary purpose of defending against Identity Risk and the
board must have compelling evidence to support an informed, good faith
belief that the rival slate in fact poses a threat arising from Identity Risk,
266. Although dicta, the court in Hills recognized that if the board had approved the
Dickstein Change of Control, it would have denied the Covered Executives of the exact
protection the Employment Agreements were designed to provide and thereby breached its
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. See Hills Stores Co. v. Bozic, 769 A.2d 88 (Del.
Ch. 2000).
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among other things. Without meeting these requirements, the board
arguably lacked authority to grant the protection in the first place,
rendering the creditor’s interest in the proxy put’s exercise unenforceable.
Therefore, within an Identity Risk framework, a creditor would have no
reasonable expectation of protection absent the board’s satisfaction of the
above requirements. In other words, a creditor cannot prove a breach of
contract without also proving that the board breached its fiduciary duty of
loyalty by passing control of the company to a rival slate of known looters
or persons of suspect integrity notwithstanding compelling evidence in
support of such a determination. The potency of proxy puts would thus
require both parties to believe in good faith that they are each agreeing to it
for a proper purpose and recognize that for the board to have the authority
to grant the protection, its ability to trigger the remedy must be
circumstantially narrow. As emphasized above, this framework would
allow boards and creditors to confidently adopt valid, enforceable proxy
puts by aligning stockholders’, companies’, and creditors’ interests in
Identity Risk protection. That the framework of review of contract claims
would mirror the framework of review of fiduciary duty claims in
maintaining the alignment of those interests is self-evident.
D.

Extending the Framework

By now, one might validly question whether the adoption of proxy
puts would continue if subject to this Identity Risk framework. As stated
previously, the purpose of this framework is not to discourage the use of
proxy puts, but to limit the device’s validity to legally and equitably
defensible circumstances and to incentivize parties to adapt devices to
protect against Event Risk without interfering with the stockholder
franchise to the extent proxy puts do. This Section explores extending the
framework to devices resembling proxy puts but that reach beyond the
narrow, primary purpose of protecting against Identity Risk and to devices
that are arguably not proxy puts at all.
Adopting this Identity Risk framework would probably have the
following effect on proxy puts. First, the validity of existing proxy puts
would be narrowed by the presumption that their only valid primary
purpose is to protect against Identity Risk. Such proxy puts would
arguably remain valid, subject to their exercise under compelling
circumstances. Second, new proxy puts adopted for the primary purpose of
protecting against Identity Risk would be adapted to this framework.
Finally, for existing or new proxy puts whose primary purpose is arguably
not to protect against Identity Risk, the device’s components would be
drafted to be proportionate to that purpose. This Section considers this
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final category of mixed-purpose proxy puts, which resemble proxy puts
that arguably serve a primary purpose other than protecting against Identity
Risk, and other devices, which are neither triggered by a proxy fight
replacing a majority of the board nor provide a put remedy.
As discussed previously, a board may seek to rebut the
disenfranchising presumption by arguing that a mixed-purpose proxy put
was adopted for a primary purpose other than protecting against Identity
Risk. Consistent with this Comment’s argument that a creditor’s only valid
interest in a proxy put should be avoiding the harm arising from Identity
Risk, a board would only grant a creditor a proxy put for a different
purpose by narrowing the proxy put’s components to be proportionate to
that purpose. Furthermore, a board’s failure to demonstrate that the
components of a mixed-purpose proxy put are proportionate to its purpose
would be strong evidence that the primary purpose of the device was in fact
disenfranchising. For example, in Healthways, SunTrust argued that as a
lender, it had a legitimate interest in knowing the identity of its borrower:
[I]t’s really designed to sort of give the creditors an opportunity
to evaluate the credit situation and the risk situation if either
within a one-year period or a two-year period there suddenly is a
change in the composition of the board so that the majority is all
of a sudden different.267
...
[I]f you have a fundamental change, where a majority of your
board turns over, it just gives the borrower the ability to
completely clean house, change management, change business
direction, which obviously may show up in the form of other
covenants, or may not.268
There, the stated risk to SunTrust was not that a new board would
consist of known looters or persons of suspect integrity, but that a new
board might change the direction of the business without triggering any of
the creditor’s other protective covenants. Even assuming SunTrust’s
interest in such protection was legitimate and non-pretextual, both
SunTrust and Healthways failed to demonstrate how a put remedy above
par was proportionate to any harm that might arise from a new board
simply taking the company in a different direction. In this scenario, the
SunTrust proxy put would have been more defensible had it drafted a
double trigger requiring not only an unapproved election of a new board
majority, but also a decline in Healthways’ credit rating within a reasonable

267. Healthways Transcript at 26.
268. Healthways Transcript at 27.
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period of time.269 And even with a narrower trigger, it is not clear how an
enormous put remedy would be proportionate to harm arising from a mere
change in credit rating. Alternatively, under the facts of Healthways, a dual
trigger proxy put providing an interest rate adjustment upon a credit rating
decline occurring within a reasonable period of time after a change in board
majority would probably have been proportionate to SunTrust’s stated
purpose. Additionally, since neither Healthways nor its stockholders would
benefit from this protection the same way they would from protection
against Identity Risk, the board probably would have to have negotiated for
a proportionate concession from SunTrust. But because the proxy put’s
components were so disproportionate to SunTrust’s stated purpose, the
court could have reasonably concluded that the proxy put’s primary
purpose was disenfranchising.
This example is not comprehensive, but highlights two facts. First,
very few compelling justifications, if any, support a creditor’s interest in
putting its debt back to the company at a premium above par upon the
stockholders’ election of a new board majority. This Comment suggests
that the only compelling justification for such an extreme toll on the
stockholder franchise is when the creditor’s interests are aligned with those
of the company and the stockholders, namely, in order to protect against
Identity Risk. Second, because a creditor’s valid interest in a proxy put is
so limited, a board that grants a creditor the protection of a device
resembling a proxy put, but for the primary purpose of protecting against
something other than Identity Risk, may only do so if the device’s
components are narrowly proportionate to another valid purpose. Here,
relating the device’s trigger to the stockholder franchise is arguably
justified, but providing a put remedy is probably not. Thus, it is possible
that the only valid proxy put purporting to protect a creditor from
something other than Identity Risk is one whose trigger and remedy are
adapted so that the device no longer in fact operates as a proxy put.
Although this Comment has primarily focused on proxy puts in
lending agreements, the Identity Risk framework explored herein is
reasonably extended to proxy puts adopted in other types of agreements.
For example, in Hills, the board entered into Severance agreements with
certain covered executives that included large buy-out provisions that
triggered upon the unapproved election of the Dickstein slate.270 Within an

269. Consistent with SunTrust’s argument, this dual trigger differs from a pure rating
decline trigger in that it protects against the risk of a new board on whom SunTrust was
unable to conduct due diligence. In other words, SunTrust contracted for the risk that the
direction of the business under the current board might lead to a credit rating decline, but
not for such a risk under the leadership or direction of a new board.
270. Hills Stores Co. v. Bozic, 769 A.2d 88, 91–92 (Del. Ch. 2000).
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Identity Risk framework, the Hills board probably would have rebutted the
disenfranchising presumption because, as the court in Hills concluded, the
board entered into the Severance agreements for the primary purpose of
retaining the covered executives at a time when they were likely to resign
their positions.271 These agreements are materially different than the debt
agreements containing proxy puts considered throughout this Comment.
Unlike creditors, the covered executives in Hills had the power and the
right to protect themselves from any perceived risk of harm by terminating
their agreements and walking away.272 And after the company granted the
Severance agreement, the covered executives avoided harming the
company and any perceived risk of harm to them arising from the change
of control by staying at Hills until the triggering event. Importantly, the
threat of harm to Hills in the Dickstein Change of Control did not arise
from Dickstein’s identity, but instead from his plans to dramatically
increase leverage after winning board control. Thus, the board could not
have adopted the Severance agreements for the primary purpose of
disenfranchising the stockholders because Dickstein posed a threat of harm
to the company arising from Event Risk, not Identity Risk, and protecting
against Event Risk is not a compelling justification.
This example highlights the fact that boards enter into agreements
with other parties whose interests in the identity of a new board majority
may not be as limited as a creditor’s interest is. Employment agreements
are one such example. A license agreement is another. Consider a
company whose business relies heavily on a license agreement granting it
an exclusive right to use patented technology. There, the licensor is
probably unconcerned with the identity of a new board majority under most
circumstances, but is probably very concerned about a direct competitor
taking control of the board and gaining access to the licensed technology.
A provision that protects the licensor from such a change in board majority,
rather than a change in ownership or control of the company itself, by
requiring the company to terminate its use of the licensed technology at no
cost to the licensor is arguably disenfranchising by virtue of penalizing the
stockholders for exercising their franchise. Yet the board’s primary
271. Id. at 102.
272. Even though the court in SandRidge pointed out that the covered executives in
Hills did have an interest in the identity of the board that differed in kind and degree from a
creditor’s interest, SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 262, the covered executives’ interests in the
Severance agreements did not arise from any exposure to Identity Risk as defined in this
Comment. As stated, the covered executives could have avoided any such risk by quitting.
Instead, the Severance agreements arose from the company’s exposure to harm upon the
covered executives’ mass departure. Though subtle, this distinction clarifies that the
Identity Risk framework is concerned with the company’s primary purpose, not that of its
counterparty.
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purpose in adopting the provision was not to disenfranchise the
stockholders, but to secure the rights to the patented technology upon
which its business heavily relies in the first place. Thus, a board would
only have to rebut the disenfranchising presumption and demonstrate the
device’s proportionality rather than a compelling justification. Again, this
is because the licensor’s interest in protection against a new board majority
arose from the narrow risk that its patented technology would fall into a
competitor’s hands, not the risk that a new board majority would consist of
known looters or individuals of suspect integrity.
As the above examples demonstrate, reviewing proxy puts, mixedpurpose proxy puts, and other devices related to the shareholder franchise
within this Comment’s Identity Risk framework is advisable because
boards will probably continue including them in various agreements. In
fact, the framework specifically contemplates boards doing so by defining
Identity Risk narrowly and making clear both how to validly adopt and
exercise a proxy put and how to avoid compelling justification review for
mixed-purpose proxy puts and other devices. Accordingly, reviewing the
adoption and exercise of these devices within an Identity Risk framework
regulates a board’s ability to do so validly by attaching the disenfranchising
presumption. Anticipating the need to rebut the presumption, a board will
either adopt proxy puts for the primary purpose of protecting the company
from Identity Risk or document its negotiations and deliberations in
support of the primary purpose of protecting the company from a threat
falling outside the scope of Identity Risk. Finally, the disenfranchising
presumption also signals to the market that devices closely resembling
proxy puts are more likely to require compelling justification review and
encourages the development of more narrowly tailored change of control
provisions. These modifications would not only increase the value of these
devices to companies and to creditors by more efficiently reducing agency
costs of debt and equity, but also increase the ability of the court to conduct
its compelling justification and proportionality reviews by incentivizing
thorough recordkeeping.
E.

Reconsidering Prior Cases

This framework would not have materially altered the outcomes of
Hills and SandRidge, but may have had an impact on the outcome in
Amylin. First, the court in Hills still would have concluded that the board
did not adopt the Severance agreements for the primary purpose of
disenfranchising the stockholders, held that the board made an informed,
good faith determination that the Dickstein Change of Control posed a
threat to the company, and estopped the plaintiff from arguing that the
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remedy under the agreements was disproportionate to its proper purpose.
Second, assuming the SandRidge board conceded that the proxy put was
disenfranchising because it was adopted for the narrow purpose of
protecting against Identity Risk, the court in SandRidge still would have
concluded that the SandRidge board had failed to exercise its fiduciary
duties in good faith by failing to neutralize the proxy put and that its
fiduciary duty to do so did not breach its contractual duty to its creditor.
Accordingly, the court in SandRidge still would never have reached a
proportionality analysis.
By contrast, if the court in Amylin had faced the same record, the court
probably would have concluded that the board had the contractual right to
trigger the proxy put in the absence of compelling evidence that the rival
slate was composed of known looters or persons of suspect integrity.
However, the court in Amylin could have reached any conclusion with a
complete record had this framework incentivized the parties to document
their negotiations and deliberations thoroughly.
CONCLUSION
This Comment began by identifying two questions left unanswered in
SandRidge. First, does a board of directors have the requisite authority to
bind the corporation to a proxy put designed to prevent stockholders from
electing a new board of directors? Second, under what circumstances and
to what degree is a board of directors permitted to trade its stockholders’
right to elect the board of directors in favor of other interests? Finding the
broad characterization of proxy puts in SandRidge to be of dubious validity
under both the first and second questions, this Comment interpreted
narrowly SandRidge and other cases addressing proxy puts and explored
the components and operation of proxy puts in order to establish a stronger
legal basis for upholding them. Given the limited extent to which proxy
puts provide unique protection, this Comment suggested that a board of
directors should only have the authority to adopt a proxy put for the limited
purpose of protecting against Identity Risk—a concern distinct from Event
Risk proposed herein—and even then may only adopt and exercise proxy
puts that are narrowly tailored to that limited purpose. In order to regulate
shareholder-creditor agency costs arising from proxy puts, this Comment
adopted a Liquid Audio standard of review in order to account for both a
disenfranchising presumption that attaches to proxy puts comporting with
Identity Risk and a subsequent proportionality and reasonableness analysis
consistent with Unocal review.
This Comment found that adopting an Identity Risk framework
provides boards and creditors with a reasonable amount of clarity regarding
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the circumstances under which they will be subject to Blasius’s compelling
justification review, the circumstances under which they will be subject to
Unocal’s heightened reasonableness review, and the requirements for
staying within either and satisfying both. This clarity is valuable especially
in light of the recent Healthways case, which demonstrated the court’s
willingness to find a creditor liable for aiding and abetting a board’s breach
of its fiduciary duties in adopting a proxy put for an improper purpose—
even if the case was only decided on a motion to dismiss. Finding the
navigation of this framework to be relatively simple, this Comment
concludes that narrowing the validity of proxy puts to protecting against
Identity Risk would probably reduce creditor-shareholder agency costs by
discouraging, but not prohibiting, boards and creditors from adopting proxy
puts in favor of less disenfranchising devices that are more narrowly
tailored to other purposes and also by incentivizing boards and creditors to
document negotiations and deliberations relating to change of control
provisions by attaching a disenfranchising presumption to devices
resembling proxy puts. Taken together, this approach aligns a company’s
interests in proxy puts with those of its creditors’ and stockholders’ and
makes Delaware more creditor-friendly by recognizing legitimate creditor
interests and framing clearly the circumstances under and extent to which a
board of directors may validly protect those interests through contract
provisions.

